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TORT LAW’S DEVALUATION OF 
STILLBIRTH 
Jill Wieber Lens* 
In the United States, more than sixty-five babies die daily due to stillbirth—
the death of an unborn baby after twenty weeks of pregnancy but before birth. 
New medical research suggests that at least one-fourth of those deaths are pre-
ventable with proper medical care. Stated differently, one-fourth of stillbirths are 
due to medical malpractice. In almost all states, tort law provides recourse for 
mothers after the death of their children due to stillbirth. 
This Article uses feminist legal theory and empirical research of parents af-
ter stillbirth to demonstrate that tort law devalues stillbirth. That devaluation is 
due to the cognitive bias associating stillbirth with women. Historically, stillbirth 
only appeared in women’s claims for emotional distress. Instead of recognizing 
her child’s death, courts treated, and some courts continue to treat, stillbirth as 
just as a physical manifestation of the woman’s emotional distress. Even when 
modern courts allow a wrongful death claim for stillbirth, properly recognizing 
stillbirth as the death of a child, they still devalue the parents’ loss by character-
izing the child as a nameless, genderless “fetus.” Also historically, courts were 
resistant to claims based on relational injuries, another injury stereotypically as-
sociated with women. Even though prenatal attachment theory demonstrates a 
parent-child relationship is lost in stillbirth, some courts are especially reluctant 
to recognize the relational injury in the context of death before birth. The cogni-
tive bias associating stillbirth with women has also stunted the development of 
tort recourse for fathers, as it also will for non-biological parents. Fathers, the 
“forgotten bereaved,” are sometimes denied a claim or given a more limited 
claim. 
The remedy for this devaluation is a wrongful death claim for the death of a 
child—not just a fetus—available to both parents, including recovery for the rela-
tional injury. Tort law must also guard against possible undervaluation of the 
parents’ injury based on the supposed replaceability of children or the presence 
of other living children, and against damage caps’ mandatory undervaluation of 
the parents’ injury. The Article also explains how these reforms are supported by 
tort law theories and explains that the wrongful death claim should be available 
for all stillbirths, not depending on viability. Last, the Article necessarily explains 
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that tort law’s proper recognition of stillbirth poses no threat to the legality of 
abortion. 
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“I carried you for every second of your life, 
and I will love you for every second of mine.”—Unknown 
INTRODUCTION 
My son, Caleb, died on June 19, 2017. One minute, his heart was beating, 
and the next, it was not. His father and I held him in our arms while making fu-
neral decisions no parent should ever have to make. We kissed him for the last 
time and said goodbye. 
Not that any child death is normal, but Caleb’s death may have been espe-
cially abnormal because he died before he was born. Two weeks before we 
were scheduled to induce labor, at thirty-seven weeks of pregnancy, my placen-
ta completely detached from my uterus, instantly depriving sweet Caleb of ox-
ygen and necessary nutrients. We had gone to the hospital only because I was 
feeling uncomfortable, not having any idea of the news we were about to re-
ceive. But then, the nurses could not find Caleb’s heartbeat. Hours and an ultra-
sound later, the on-call doctor confirmed what we already knew; Caleb had 
died. The doctor also explained that I was bleeding internally and needed to de-
liver Caleb as soon as possible. I needed to deliver my son like I had his sisters, 
but, this time, my son had already died. 
I do not remember much of Caleb’s delivery due to the drugs my doctor 
gave me. Some of the painful contractions woke me up momentarily. My hus-
band was sober for all of it. When I woke up, my husband was holding Caleb. 
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He was beautiful. He was five pounds, fifteen ounces, and nineteen inches long. 
He had less hair than his sisters, but looked just like them. 
Caleb was stillborn. Medically speaking, miscarriage is the loss of preg-
nancy before twenty weeks gestational age, and stillbirth is loss of pregnancy 
after twenty weeks of pregnancy, but before birth.1 Like most parents, I really 
had no idea what stillbirth was until it happened to my child. The next morning, 
I sent an email to my assistant—in response to an email asking if the baby had 
arrived—that I had “miscarried.” But Caleb’s death was not a miscarriage. It 
was not even a pregnancy loss. I held Caleb in my arms and kissed him good-
bye. I buried my son. 
Even though he was dead, Caleb was still born. “[I]n stillbirth there is a 
birth, somebody was born, and someone did the birthing.”2 Anthropologist Dr. 
Linda Layne explains that stillbirth “contradicts two fundamental premises of 
the women’s-health discourse of pregnancy and birth—that women can control 
their reproduction and that birth is a natural, joyful experience.”3 I neither 
chose my placental abruption nor was his birth joyful, although I can now look 
back and see much joy in the many hours I got to hold him skin-to-skin and to 
kiss his sweet little face. 
I soon learned about the commonality of stillbirths. In 2013, approximately 
24,000 babies died due to stillbirth in the United States.4 That is over 65 babies 
each day. Other estimates are higher: “[i]n the United States (U.S.), an estimat-
ed 70 stillbirths occur each day, on average 25,000 each year.”5 
From what we know, due to the apparent quickness of my abruption and 
the lack of bleeding or pain, nothing could have been done to prevent Caleb’s 
death. My husband and I are comforted by this. Not all parents have that same 
comfort. Many stillbirths can be prevented. In fact, a 2018 study concluded 
“approximately one fourth of stillbirths that occur in the United States are po-
tentially preventable” through medical care.6 Using the 2013 national data, that 
means over 6,000 of babies could have been born alive and still be alive today. 
The authors of the study also emphasized that their estimates were conserva-
tive, implying that more than one-fourth of stillbirths could be prevented.7 
                                                        
1  Facts About Stillbirth, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 2, 2017), https:// 
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/stillbirth/facts.html [https://perma.cc/MK9U-EZAV]. 
2  Maureen C. Kelley & Susan B. Trinidad, Silent Loss and the Clinical Encounter: Parents’ 
and Physicians’ Experiences of Stillbirth—a Qualitative Analysis, BIOMED CENT. 
PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH, Nov. 27, 2012, at 13. 
3  LINDA L. LAYNE, MOTHERHOOD LOST: A FEMINIST ACCOUNT OF PREGNANCY LOSS IN 
AMERICA 241 (2003). 
4  Marian F. MacDorman & Elizabeth C.W. Gregory, Fetal and Perinatal Mortality: United 
States, 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. (2015), available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data 
/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP43-2CYC]. 
5  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 2. 
6  Jessica M. Page et al., Potentially Preventable Stillbirth in a Diverse U.S. Cohort, 131 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 336, 340 (2018). 
7  Id. 
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After Caleb’s death, people often told me that they could not “imagine” our 
loss. Imaginable or not, it is the exact loss that tort law attempts to compensate 
when stillbirth is caused by tortious conduct. Examples of such tortious conduct 
include a doctor giving improper medical care,8 or a car accident that causes the 
woman’s placenta to detach or causes another complication that kills the child. 
Whatever the tortious cause, tort law must figure out how to best compensate 
parents after they unnecessarily lose their unborn child. 
Tort law, however, devalues the injury of stillbirth. “Devaluation is a kind 
of bias that . . . . affects value judgments, such as those made about the serious-
ness of certain conduct or the importance of an activity” or an injury.9 The bias 
results from an association between the injury and gender, even though the in-
jury itself lacks that gender.10 Feminist legal scholar Martha Chamallas has per-
suasively argued that “contemporary tort law devalues or undervalues the lives, 
activities, and potential of women . . . .”11 This Article will use feminist legal 
theory and empirical research of parents after stillbirth to demonstrate that tort 
law also devalues stillbirth, mostly due to the association of stillbirth with 
women. 
Tort law has always associated stillbirth with women, specifically with 
“hysterical” women.12 The first appearance of stillbirth in tort law was in 
claims brought by women for emotional distress.13 Tort law has long recog-
nized a distinction between claims for physical injury and non-physical, emo-
tional injuries, originally not allowing any recovery for emotional injuries.14 
Feminist legal scholars have traced that initial resistance to the fact that most 
early claims for emotional distress were brought by women, creating a cogni-
tive association.15 Those same cases often also involved miscarriages and still-
birth—the woman was so frightened that the fetus or unborn baby in her womb 
died.16 
Undoubtedly, something physical happens to a woman in stillbirth. The 
baby in her womb dies, and the woman then still delivers that child just like she 
                                                        
8  See id. at 342 (recommending proper “obstetric surveillance to identify potential placental 
insufficiency as well as other maternal conditions that can be targeted in efforts to reduce 
stillbirth . . . .”). 
9  Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 463, 470 (1998) [hereinafter Chamallas, Architecture]. 
10  Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Bi-
ased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 772 (2001). 
11  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 467. For a criticism of feminist tort theory, see 
generally Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
175 (2001). 
12  See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts 
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 65 (1989) (“[H]istorically, women’s complaints of pain 
or injury have often been dismissed as emotional or hysterical complaints.”). 
13  See infra Section II.A. 
14  See infra Section II.A. 
15  See infra Section II.A. 
16  See infra Section II.A. 
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would a living baby. But courts chose not to focus on that physical part, instead 
making stillbirth just a component of a woman’s claim for emotional distress.17 
This classification fit well with a rule that courts eventually adopted to limit re-
covery for emotional distress—that the plaintiff suffer some physical manifes-
tation of that emotional distress. Her child’s stillbirth was such a manifesta-
tion.18 Thus, the first major recognition of stillbirth in tort law was not as an 
injury itself, but as verification that the hysterical woman experienced emotion-
al distress. Even today, some courts still treat stillbirth as a physical manifesta-
tion of emotional distress and then struggle to apply tort law’s rules that limit 
recovery in claims for emotional distress, as opposed to physical injury.19 
Most courts avoid this struggle by recognizing a wrongful death claim for 
stillbirth, but even this recognition is sometimes devaluing. Specifically, courts 
still often devalue the parents’ loss by treating it as something less than their 
child’s death by focusing on the fact that the baby was still in the mother’s 
womb at the time of death.20 This leads courts to describe the deceased baby 
not as the parents’ son or daughter, but as a fetus, just a part of the mother’s 
body. The “fetus” characterization of the child that the parent buried devalues 
the parents’ injury. 
Not only is stillbirth associated with women, the more general relational in-
jury caused by the death of a child, the lost parent-child relationship, is also as-
sociated with women. Both emotional distress and a relational injury will result 
from, for example, a mother’s witnessing of her child’s injury or death.21 Rela-
tional injuries, just like emotional distress, were more often claimed by wom-
en.22 Even today, although less so, children are considered to be at the center of 
the mother’s life, but not necessarily the father’s life, meaning only women suf-
fer this relational injury.23 Like it has emotional injuries, tort law has long de-
valued relational injuries. 
Given that tort law is reluctant to recognize relational injuries generally, it 
is not surprising that tort law would question whether stillbirth even involves a 
relational injury. How can a relationship be lost in stillbirth when the child nev-
er lived outside of the womb? The child was not born alive. A few decades ago, 
the mother likely never even saw her baby. Today, even if the parents spent 
time with their baby, they never got to see him open his eyes, hear him cry, or 
hear him giggle. This reluctance devalues the parents’ injury. The parents lost 
their child, a child who the parents desired and with whom they had already 
                                                        
17  See infra Section II.A. 
18  See infra Section II.A. 
19  See infra Section II.A. 
20  See infra Section II.A. 
21  See infra Section II.B. 
22  See infra Section II.B. 
23  See infra Section II.B. 
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bonded—a bond proven true by prenatal attachment theory—despite his dying 
before birth.24 
The gendered association of stillbirth and women has not only affected 
mothers’ recovery, it has also has also affected fathers’ recovery. In some 
states, even still today, a father has no legal recourse against the tortfeasor who 
killed his unborn child.25 In other states, a claim exists, technically, but tort 
law’s many emotional distress limited recovery rules made recovery difficult.26 
These same hurdles would also apply to non-biological parents. Even if the fa-
ther can avoid the emotional distress rules through a wrongful death claim, cul-
tural ideas about grief can easily still cause a jury to undervalue the father’s 
loss after stillbirth; empirical research often refers to fathers as the forgotten 
bereaved. 27 
Assuming a claim exists, the measures of damages after stillbirth are easily 
susceptible to undervaluation because of dominant cultural views of stillbirth. 
Parents are retraumatized by the common reactions to stillbirth—“you can have 
another” or “at least it wasn’t your older child.” These cultural devaluations en-
courage juries to award less in damages if parents have another child or have 
other living children. Tort law currently does little to prevent undervaluation. 
Juries’ valuations of damages are also often undercut by legislative noneco-
nomic damage caps,28 the effect of which are especially harsh in cases like 
stillbirth where the only significant damages are what tort reformers label 
“noneconomic.” 
Stillbirth is more than just a terrible loss; it is the death of a baby. Stillbirth 
does sever a parent-child bond; prenatal attachment is real, and that bond is lost 
in the baby’s death. Stillbirth does not injure only the mother; it injures both 
parents and even the surviving siblings. Similarly, the things traditionally re-
garded as making it easy to “get over” stillbirth—a subsequent pregnancy and 
child, other living children, a young gestational age at the time of death—do 
not magically lessen the parents’ loss. Their child died. There is no magical fix. 
To remedy the current devaluation and recognize these realities of still-
birth, a wrongful death claim for the death of a child—not a fetus—must be 
available for both parents. The wrongful death claim should be available for all 
stillbirths, meaning all tortious deaths of unborn children after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy, instead of depending on viability, a concept from abortion law in-
applicable to tort recognition of stillbirth. Both damages for mental anguish and 
the lost parent-child relationship must be available. Tort law must also guard 
                                                        
24  See infra Section II.B. 
25  See infra Section II.C. 
26  See infra Section II.C. 
27  I refer to “fathers” here because the empirical research in Section C is specific to fathers; 
empirical research of same-sex parents after stillbirth is currently lacking. The arguments in 
the section, however, easily apply to the non-biological parent in a same sex couple. See in-
fra note 241 and accompanying text. 
28  See infra Section II.D.3. 
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against undervaluation of damages due to the possibility or presence of other 
living children. 
The compensation and deterrence purposes of tort law support these re-
forms. Unless tort law recognizes that parents lost their irreplaceable child, it is 
impossible to compensate parents as best as possible, consistent with corrective 
justice tort theory. It is also impossible to properly deter tortfeasors, including 
doctors, unless tort law recognizes that parents lost their irreplaceable child. 
Necessarily, this Article will also address the elephant in the room any time 
we contemplate allowing recovery for the tortious loss of an unborn baby—
abortion. The controversy over abortion is so strong it creates concerns that any 
recognition of the unborn will necessarily infringe on a woman’s constitutional 
right to voluntarily terminate her pregnancy. The reality, however, is that no 
inconsistency exists between proper compensation for parents that tortiously, 
and involuntarily, lose their baby, and a woman’s right to terminate her preg-
nancy. The difference in the timing of the two and the long coexistence of legal 
abortion and criminal laws specific to the (involuntary) death of an unborn 
child further supports the consistency.29 Slippery slope concerns cannot be the 
basis for denying attempts to best compensate parents after stillbirth. 
The organization of the Article is as follows. The first Part will provide a 
primer on stillbirth—its surprising commonality, the evolving treatment of it by 
parents and doctors, yet the persistent cultural devaluation of it. The second 
Part of the Article will describe tort law’s historical and modern devaluations of 
stillbirth using feminist legal theory and empirical research of parents after 
stillbirth. The third Part of this Article will more specifically describe how to 
remedy tort law’s devaluation of stillbirth and explain how that correction is 
also supported by underlying theories of tort law. The fourth Part will clarify 
the consistency between tort compensation for stillbirth and the legality of 
abortion. The last Part briefly concludes. 
I. THE TABOO OF STILLBIRTH 
In 2013, the most recent national data available, approximately 24,000 ba-
bies died due to stillbirth in the United States.30 That is over 65 babies each 
day. Approximately 2.6 million stillbirths occur in the world annually,31 half of 
which occur during labor.32 The rates of stillbirth differ depending on the race 
of the mother as the rate “for non-Hispanic black women was more than twice 
the rate for non-Hispanic white women.”33 The United States’s stillbirth rate is 
                                                        
29  See infra Part IV. 
30  MacDorman & Gregory, supra note 4, at 1. 
31  Ending Preventable Stillbirths, LANCET (Jan. 2016), http://www.thelancet.com/pb/assets/r 
aw/Lancet/stories/series/stillbirths2016-exec-summ.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7D3-AK75]. 
32  Id. 
33  MacDorman & Gregory, supra note 4, at 4. 
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higher “than in many other high-income countries, and rates continue to de-
crease in other high-income countries.”34 
Currently, the United States ranks 25th in the world in third-trimester stillbirths, 
and many countries have a more than 33 [percent] lower rate. In addition, other 
high-resource countries have recently reported dramatic decreases in stillbirth. 
For example, the stillbirth rate in the Netherlands decreased 6.8 percent 
(1.8/1,000 births) from 2000 to 2015, whereas the U.S. rate declined only 0.4 
percent (3.0/1,000 births) during the same period.35 
Infant mortality has received more attention. The U.S. infant mortality rate 
decreased 11 percent between 2006 and 2013, but the fetal mortality rate has 
“remained relatively stable for the past decade.”36 “In many developed coun-
tries, while absolute rates have never been lower, late-fetal mortality is now 
higher than infant mortality.”37 
Despite improved access to prenatal care, sophisticated medical technology, and 
frequent obstetrical visits during the final weeks of a pregnancy, sudden intrau-
terine infant death rates over the past 20 years have declined only slightly in the 
United States, and it is greater than 10 times more likely to occur than Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).38 
Multiple studies state that “[m]ore babies die as a result of stillbirth than of all 
other causes of infant deaths combined . . . .”39 
Some causes of stillbirth are known. A study of the Stillbirth Collaborative 
Research Network identified these causes, listed from most to least common: 
pregnancy with multiple babies; pregnancy complications like placental abrup-
tion where the placenta, which provides nutrients and oxygen to the baby, sepa-
rates from the uterus; problems with the placenta like insufficient blood flow; 
birth defects; infection; problems with the umbilical cord, like it getting knot-
ted, cutting off oxygen to the baby; mother’s high blood pressure; and assorted 
medical complications in the mother, such as diabetes.40 Of the data studied, 
covering over two and a half years, about one-fourth of stillbirths had no ex-
plained cause.41 Even if a cause is known, such as a placental abruption, the 
cause of the abruption may be unknown. It is hard to learn more. Data collec-
                                                        
34  Page et al., supra note 6, at 337. 
35  Id. at 341. 
36  Id. at 336–37. 
37  Robert Woods, Long-Term Trends in Fetal Mortality: Implications for Developing Coun-
tries, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 460, 460 (2008). 
38  Joanne Cacciatore, Effects of Support Groups on Post Traumatic Stress Responses in 
Women Experiencing Stillbirth, 55 OMEGA 71, 72 (2007) [hereinafter Cacciatore, Support 
Groups]. 
39  Joanne Cacciatore & Suzanne Bushfield, Stillbirth: A Sociopolitical Issue, 23 J. WOMEN 
& SOC. WORK 378, 380 (2008) [hereinafter Cacciatore, Sociopolitical] (internal citations 
omitted). 
40  See What Are Possible Causes of Stillbirth?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https:// 
www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/stillbirth/topicinfo/Pages/causes.aspx [https://perma.cc/8P 
BE-FXJ4] (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
41  See id. 
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tion is difficult as states define stillbirth differently, sometimes based on age 
and sometimes based on weight.42 Plus, only 30–40 percent of stillborn babies 
undergo an autopsy, as parents rarely wish to spend the additional thousands of 
dollars for one.43 It is hard to do research without autopsies.44 
Yet some research does exist. What we do know is that stillbirth is neither 
inevitable nor unpreventable despite pervasive myths that stillbirths are “mostly 
due to non-preventable congenital abnormalities.”45 Only around 7 percent of 
2.6 million stillbirths that occur yearly globally (using a 28-week definition of 
stillbirth) are due to congenital abnormalities, and even some of those abnor-
malities are actually preventable if the mother takes folic acid.46 A recent study 
specific to stillbirths in the United States is also attempting to correct the myth 
of fatalism surrounding stillbirth. That January 2018 study concluded that “ap-
proximately one fourth of stillbirths that occur in the United States are poten-
tially preventable.”47 More specifically, the study identified these reasons for 
stillbirth as potentially preventable: stillbirths occurring during childbirth, those 
due to maternal medical conditions, those due to hypertensive disorders during 
pregnancy, those due to placental insufficiency, and those occurring in preg-
nancy with multiples.48 The study also clarified that it used conservative criteria 
and that “compelling argument[s] [exist] that many of the stillbirths [the study] 
did not include as potentially preventable were, in fact, preventable.”49 This re-
                                                        
42  Sarah Muthler, Stillbirth Is More Common Than You Think—And We’re Doing Little 
About It, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/ 
2016/05/16/stillbirth-is-more-common-than-you-think-and-were-doing-little-about-it/?utm_t 
erm=.b3f738ac1438 [https://perma.cc/366J-GYMC]; see also State Definitions and Report-
ing Requirements for Live Births, Fetal Deaths, and Induced Terminations of Pregnancy, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (1997), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/ito 
p97.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RAL-ZJ4P]. 
43  Muthler, supra note 42. 
44  Colleen Snyder, The Missing Angels Act: Recognizing the Birth of Stillborn Babies, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 544, 548 (2008) (explaining that the lack of consistent protocols for au-
topsies after stillbirth and even the recording of stillbirths hurts research efforts regarding the 
causes of stillbirth). 
45  Joy E. Lawn et al., Stillbirths: Rates, Risk Factors, and Acceleration Towards 2030, 387 
LANCET 587, 597 (2016). 
46  Id. 
47  Page et al., supra note 6, at 340. The study specifically used the words “potentially pre-
ventable” instead of preventable, and discussed that “[t]here is no generally accepted defini-
tion of what constitutes a ‘preventable’ cause of stillbirth.” Id. at 337. Assuming that the 
word “potentially” denotes less than 100 percent preventable, the burden of proof in tort law 
requires the plaintiff to prove causation only by preponderance of evidence standard. The 
plaintiff would thus need to show that, more likely than not, the doctor’s negligence caused 
her child’s stillbirth. This roughly translates to proving facts by 51 percent, not 100 percent. 
48  See id. at 339. Study labeled stillbirths at less than twenty-four weeks of gestation, before 
the baby is viable, and those due to major fetal abnormalities and genetic conditions as un-
preventable. See id. at 337. 
49  Id. at 341. 
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search exists, but the myth of the unpreventability of stillbirth has likely stunted 
medical research and prevention efforts.50 
A 2015 National Vital Statistics Report that summarized the 2013 United 
States data characterized stillbirth as “a major but often overlooked public 
health issue.”51 Parents also overlook this possibility. For the first twenty weeks 
of the pregnancy, and especially in the first twelve weeks, parents are con-
cerned about miscarriage as research shows that as many as one in four preg-
nancies ends in miscarriage.52 After twenty weeks, the worry switches to prem-
ature birth—the baby being born before he can survive outside of the womb.53 
Few parents, if any, ever worry about stillbirth, the death of the baby while 
inside the womb after twenty weeks. Most parents do not even know about the 
chance of stillbirth—until it happens to them. After stillbirth, parents surveyed 
explain that before it happened to them, they “believed that stillbirth is a very 
rare event.”54 Most believed that good prenatal care would prevent stillbirth and 
later learned they were wrong.55 The same parents also “reported being sur-
prised to learn the actual rates of stillbirth worldwide, or that stillbirth occurs 
much at all in high-income countries like the U.S.”56 Parents do not know about 
stillbirth because they have never been informed of it. Admittedly, the chance 
of stillbirth is low; stillbirth happens in only about 1 in 160 pregnancies.57 Giv-
en the number of pregnancies, however, that low chance still results in over 
24,000 stillbirths a year.58 
Another reason stillbirth is overlooked is the assumption that it was just a 
problem in the past. It is true that “[u]ntil the late nineteenth century,” stillbirth 
and the deaths of young children were common and “a regular feature of family 
life.”59 Stillbirth was so common that it was expected to some extent.60 Regu-
                                                        
50  See Vicki Flenady et al., Stillbirths: Recall to Action in High-Income Countries, 387 
LANCET 691, 692 (2016). 
51  MacDorman & Gregory, supra note 4, at 1. 
52  Miscarriage, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/pregnancy-complicati 
ons/miscarriage/ [https://perma.cc/CV6P-LH6U] (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) [hereinafter 
Miscarriage]. 
53  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 3. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id.; see also Jo Hartley, Is Photography Helping to Break the Taboo That Surrounds Still-
birth?, SBS (Aug. 15, 2016, 2:52 PM), http://www.sbs.com.au/topics/life/family/article/2016 
/08/15/photography-helping-break-taboo-surrounds-stillbirth [https://perma.cc/D6X7-ACQ 
T] (discussing that the taboo surrounding stillbirth comes from a “lack of awareness of the 
statistics of stillbirth”). 
57  Stillbirth: Trying to Understand, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpregnancy.org/pr 
egnancy-loss/stillborn-trying-to-understand/ [https://perma.cc/75QJ-Q6Z3] (last visited Feb. 
23, 2019). 
58  MacDorman & Gregory, supra note 4, at 5. 
59  Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for 
Law, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 274 (2012). 
60  See id. at 274–75. 
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larity meant less grieving,61 and a lack of identification of the deceased baby as 
a part of the family. Parents may have buried stillborn babies, but likely not in a 
family plot and not with a funeral.62 Any name chosen for the baby would be 
re-used for the next living child.63 
Stillbirth is now less regular, and parents’ reactions to stillbirth seem to 
have changed. Now, parents recognize their deceased baby as having lived—as 
“a participating member of the family for most of the pregnancy, long before its 
birth.”64 Funerals are also more common.65 In the past thirty years, aggrieved 
parents also fought for limited external or public recognition of their stillborn 
children.66 It is especially jarring to parents when they receive a death certifi-
cate for their child, but no birth certificate.67 Mothers can attest to the fact that 
stillborn babies are very much still born, yet no birth certificate. Numerous 
states have passed a “Missing Angels Act,” enabling parents to obtain an offi-
cial “[C]ertificate of [B]irth [R]esulting in [S]tillbirth” for parents.68 
Medical treatment for parents after stillbirth has also evolved. The original 
attitude was that it was best to shield parents from the death of their baby. 
“Mothers were almost never allowed to see their infants for fear they would be 
unduly upset, as if they were not already.”69 The “[s]tandards began to change 
                                                        
61  I do not mean to imply that individual parents and families did not grieve stillborn babies. 
But the common practices do not generally reflect grief. 
62  Sanger, supra note 59, at 276. 
63  See AMY J. CATALANO, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF CHILD DEATH: MORTALITY, BURIAL, AND 
PARENTAL ATTITUDES 106 (2015). 
64  Sanger, supra note 59, at 282. The theory of prenatal attachment validates this view. See 
infra notes 216–23 and accompanying text (discussing prenatal attachment). Many reasons 
exist for this evolution. Professor Carol Sanger also explained that “social birth” has changed 
our conception of stillbirth. See Sanger, supra note 59, at 283. “Within months of conception 
the fetus not only has a sex, a name, and a face, but he or she now owns things, has prenatal 
preferences (organic food, Mozart, a smoke-free environment), its own page on Facebook, 
and a registry at Bloomingdales.” Id. Another reason the views of stillbirth have changed 
may be because families do not tend to have as many children as they used to. See Joyce E. 
McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The “Ethic of Care,” Fetal Personhood and 
Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291, 296–97 (1996) (describing that “most parents expected to 
have smaller families and as a result came to view each child as precious and irreplacea-
ble.”). 
65  Sanger, supra note 59, at 284. 
66  See id. at 280. 
67  Cacciatore, Sociopolitical, supra note 39, at 380–81 (“How can you die if you never 
were?”). 
68  Id.; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-410 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3121A 
(2019); IND. CODE § 16-37-1-8.5 (2018); IOWA CODE § 144.31A (2018); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 4-213.1 (West 2018); Mo. REV. STAT. § 193.255 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26:8-37 (West 2019); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 192.0022 (West 2017); WIS. 
STAT. § 69.145 (2017). 
69  Elizabeth Kirkley-Best & Kenneth R. Kellner, The Forgotten Grief: A Review of the Psy-
chology of Stillbirth, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 420, 425 (1982); see also Samantha Mur-
phy & Joanne Cacciatore, The Psychological, Social, and Economic Impact of Stillbirth on 
Families, 22 SEMINARS IN FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 129, 130 (2017) (“Until the 1970s, 
mothers were not allowed to see or hold a baby who died.”). 
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in the 1980s with the emergence of parental grassroot support groups demand-
ing access to the child.”70 The emphasis shifted from shielding parents to sup-
porting parents. “[T]he modern standard of care is to offer grieving parents re-
peated and extended opportunities to have close contact with their baby.”71 
Empirical social science research continues to influence medical care, even 
studying how the baby should be offered to the parents, and how medical care 
can help the parents to cope with the loss of their child.72 Today, “[s]ome [hos-
pitals] routinely photograph stillbirths, give parents photographs, the baby’s 
name tag, or a lock of hair.”73 Improved medical care can hopefully prevent the 
most common regret parents have after stillbirth—not holding their baby at all, 
or not holding him longer.74 
Support groups also now exist.75 In studies, women have emphasized “the 
value of talking with someone who had gone through this before.”76 Support 
groups give parents an opportunity to talk about their babies and the ability to 
use their knowledge of stillbirth to help others. Research has shown that 
“[w]omen who participated in support groups after the death of their child to 
stillbirth experienced significantly fewer traumatic stress symptoms than wom-
en . . . who did not attend support groups.”77 
                                                        
70  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 130. 
71  Position Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 2 (Aug. 2016), availa-
ble at http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PLIDA_BereavedParentsRighttoSel 
f-Determination.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHB8-WRCP]; see also Joanne Cacciatore, The Silent 
Birth: A Feminist Perspective, 54 SOC. WORK 91, 93 (2009) [hereinafter Cacciatore, Femi-
nist] (“Improved standards of compassionate care in hospitals, supportive nurturance from 
family and friends, and support groups contribute to a lessening of posttraumatic stress re-
sponses and chronic, debilitating grief.”); Sanger, supra note 59, at 283–85 (describing 
changes in hospitals allowing parents to spend time with the infant and preparing memory 
boxes for parents). 
72  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 130–31; Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, 
at 426 (describing that research shows “almost unanimous agreement that seeing and holding 
the infant is helpful in successful grief resolution”). 
73  SALLY CLINE, LIFTING THE TABOO: WOMEN, DEATH AND DYING 171–72 (1996); see also 
Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 11–12 (describing standardized procedure in the UK to 
offer “photographs and footprints, and strongly encourag[e] parents to hold their stillborn 
infant” and describing the importance of clinician empathy). In Australia, many hospitals 
now offer “refrigerated bassinets that allow parents to spend some time with their child.” 
Hagar Cohen & Alex McClintock, Chloe’s Story, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:33 PM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-05/chloe-the-story-of-a-stillborn-baby/7805998 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/4VF5-ZMEZ]. The hospital depicted in the news story allows couples “to spend 
up to seven days with their baby.” Id. This practice is unique to Australia. Id. 
74  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 130; Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 
426 (describing that research shows “almost unanimous agreement that seeing and holding 
the infant is helpful in successful grief resolution”). 
75  See Cacciatore, Support Groups, supra note 38, at 73. 
76  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 8. 
77  Cacciatore, Support Groups, supra note 38, at 83–84. 
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For parents, support groups are “one of the few ‘safe places’ to talk about 
their grief” after stillbirth.78 Any parent who has experienced stillbirth knows 
firsthand that, outside of a support group, people do not want to talk about it.79 
Many reasons likely exist for the avoidance. Maybe stillbirth makes people un-
comfortable.80 That would not be surprising as stillbirth often involves the 
death of a baby who could have survived outside of the womb, meaning he was 
in literally the only place that would kill him. Or maybe people do not talk 
about stillbirth because they assume the parents do not want to talk about it.81 
Or maybe people do not want to talk about stillbirth because they consciously 
or unconsciously minimize it. It is “not a lack of sympathy or goodwill that is 
the problem but the absence of accepted cultural scripts for how to behave in 
such circumstances.”82 This means that that “[t]he tragedy of stillbirth is a quiet 
tragedy.”83 Even “[f]amily and friends may . . . act as if the birth and death had 
simply never happened in the first instance.”84 
The avoidance is surprising because it seems unique to stillbirth. The death 
of living children is obviously upsetting, but, culturally, we do not avoid it to 
the same extent. Often, the death of children is highlighted even though adults 
also died.85 The child deaths serve as the basis for some action to attempt to 
prevent further similar child death.86 A funeral for a deceased child is, of 
course, appropriate. Similarly, many in society pay great attention to abortions. 
Many take great actions to attempt to prevent those terminations of pregnancy. 
Some states even want to mandate proper burial of fetal remains after abor-
tion.87 But if the death is involuntary and later in pregnancy, little, if any, 
acknowledgement exists. Culturally, we “do[] not readily embrace practices or 
rituals to honor the death of a stillborn child.”88 
The deaths of babies in stillbirth are not acknowledged and neither is the 
resultant grief.89 Parents have “all the emotions and loss that would attend the 
death of any child or loved one,” but lack “the social space to legitimize it or 
                                                        
78  Id. at 81. 
79  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13 (explaining that parents want to talk about their 
children, but that society does not treat stillbirth as equivalent to the death of a baby). 
80  See JOHN DEFRAIN ET AL., STILLBORN: THE INVISIBLE DEATH 83 (1986). 
81  Id. 
82  LAYNE, supra note 3, at 69. 
83  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 420. 
84  JANE LITTLEWOOD, ASPECTS OF GRIEF: BEREAVEMENT IN ADULT LIFE 124 (1992). 
85  Sean Hannon Williams, Dead Children, 67 ALA. L. REV. 739, 746–47 (2016) (explaining 
that when the media “singl[es] out child victims in . . . larger tragedies,” which it commonly 
does, it “suggest[s] that child deaths are a special tragedy, over and above the tragedy of 
mere adult death.”). 
86  See id. at 747–48 (explaining that legislators often name bills and laws after dead chil-
dren). 
87  See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25 (2018). 
88  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 11. 
89  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 420. 
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make space for expressing those emotions.”90 Imagine if your child died, but 
you were not “able to grieve openly,” nor “able to openly celebrate or remem-
ber [your] baby’s birth and death, long after the experience.”91 Parents feel iso-
lated due to “the awkwardness and discomfort felt by others when parents of a 
stillborn try to discuss their experience, or when they try to normalize it by 
mentioning their stillborn child alongside their live children as part of their 
family.”92 The lack of acknowledgement retraumatizes parents and it devalues 
the parents’ loss.93 
II. TORT LAW’S DEVALUATION OF STILLBIRTH 
Some of the at least sixty-five daily stillbirths are due to tort. Maybe the 
defendant texts while driving, hitting a pregnant woman. That collision could 
cause her placenta to detach from her uterus, killing her unborn baby possibly 
within minutes. Or, more commonly, the cause is medical malpractice. Maybe 
the doctor missed early signs of placental abruption on an ultrasound or warn-
ing signs during delivery that an emergency caesarean section was necessary. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a 2018 study concluded that one-fourth of 
stillbirths in the United States are preventable through proper medical care.94 A 
lack of proper medical care is medical malpractice, meaning one-fourth of still-
births are due to medical malpractice. At some point, medicine will hopefully 
advance and be better able to prevent stillbirth. As medical care improves, and 
more babies can be saved, medical malpractice means some of those babies 
will still die. Regardless, some of the sixty-five plus daily stillbirths in the U.S. 
are due to tort, requiring tort law to attempt to compensate parents for the un-
necessary death of their unborn baby. 
Not surprisingly, “[c]laims for negligently caused stillbirth have vexed the 
courts of our nation for many years.”95 Despite the difficulty, most states, either 
legislatively or judicially, have recognized one or both of two legal claims.96 
                                                        
90  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 9; see Joanna Cacciatore et al., When a Baby Dies: 
Ambiguity and Stillbirth, 44 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 439, 443 (2008) [hereinafter Cacciatore 
et al., Ambiguity] (discussing how stillborn infants are “often demarcated from other types of 
child death and [are] rarely legitimized as a real loss.”). 
91  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 9. 
92  Id. 
93  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 131 (explaining that “stillbirth is a loss often 
unacknowledged and invalidated by society”). 
94  See Page et al., supra note 6, at 342. 
95  Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 1997); see also Presley v. Newport Hosp., 
365 A.2d 748, 750 (R.I. 1976) (“The status of the unborn has long been an especially trou-
blesome area of the law.”). 
96  Some states appear to have not recognized either claim, including Colorado, Montana, 
and Wyoming. In each of the states, no wrongful death claim appears to exist and I could not 
find any case law recognizing a malpractice claim. See generally Stodghill v. Pelner, No. 
07CV522, 2010 WL 9103730 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 2010) (rejecting a wrongful death claim); 
Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting a wrongful death claim); 
see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-101 (2018). 
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The majority of states recognize a wrongful death claim for stillbirth.97 A 
wrongful death claim is a statutory claim for “certain beneficiaries who suffer 
from another’s death as a result of a tort.”98 The beneficiary will still need to 
establish that the defendant committed a tort, but to sue for a death, the claim 
must be brought under the wrongful death statute. A wrongful death claim is 
the same type of claim that would be available for the tortious death of a living 
child. Applied to stillbirth, parents are allowed to bring a claim and recover 
damages, whatever type allowed by the statute, if they can prove the death of 
their unborn baby was due to tort. The most common types of damages availa-
ble are general mental anguish damages and loss of consortium damages, which 
compensate for the lost parent-child relationship.99 The availability, however, 
depends on what the statute allows. 
The minority of states recognize a different claim. They do not recognize 
stillbirth as a death, but instead treat the death of the unborn baby as an emo-
tional injury to the mother who was carrying the baby at the time of the baby’s 
death.100 Thus, the minority of states also recognize a common law tort claim 
                                                        
97  At least forty states recognize a wrongful death claim for an unborn child. Numerous 
states have done so by statute. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (2018) (Arkansas); 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (2018) (Illinois); IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2018) (Indiana); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1901 (2018) (Kansas); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.2 (2018) (Loui-
siana); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922a (2018) (Michigan); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-7-13 
(2019) (Mississippi); NEB. REV. STAT. 30-809(1) (2018) (Nebraska); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, § 1053 (West 2018) (Oklahoma); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2018) (South Dakota); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (2018) (Tennessee); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.003 (West 2017) (Texas, but excepting that no wrongful death claim exists for the death 
of an unborn child due to medical malpractice). Other states have recognized the claim 
through judicial interpretation of the state’s wrongful death act. See Mack v. Carmack, 79 
So. 3d 597, 611 (Ala. 2011); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 
1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 224 A.2d 406 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & 
Ferrara, 128 A.2d 557, 558 (Del. Super. Ct. 1956); Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 
A.2d 394, 395 (D.C. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Cas-
tro v. Melchor, 366 P.3d 1058, 1065–66 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 
11, 15 (Idaho 1982); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832–34 (Iowa 1983); Mitch-
ell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71, 73 
(Md. 1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975); Verkennes 
v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Minn. 1949); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 
1969); Poliquin v. Macdonald, 135 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 
619 P.2d 826, 830 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. 
1987); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 476 
N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ohio 1985); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 639–40 (Or. 
1974); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Pa. 1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 
A.2d 748, 754 (R.I. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 45 (S.C. 1964); Nelson v. 
Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 
A.2d 92, 94 (Vt. 1980); Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266, 268 (Wash. 1975); Farley v. Sartin, 
466 S.E.2d 522, 535 (W. Va. 1995); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 
N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wisc. 1967). 
98 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 503 (2d ed. 2011). 
99  See infra Section B. 
100  See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1977); Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 
2d 705, 708–09 (Fla. 1997); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988); Broadnax v. 
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not for the unborn child’s death, but for the emotional distress the mother suf-
fered. Damages in a negligence claim are limited to general mental anguish.101 
Loss of consortium damages are generally not available.102 
Legal claims exist, technically. But tort law still devalues stillbirth. It does 
so expressly by treating stillbirth as something less than the death of a child and 
by questioning whether the parents had a relationship with their child before 
stillbirth. Tort law also does so by denying or minimizing the father’s injury 
after stillbirth. Implicitly, tort law also devalues stillbirth by failing to guard 
against juries’ discounting of parents’ damages because of the possibility or 
presence of living children and by capping parents’ recovery of their noneco-
nomic damages.103 
A. Something Less Than the Death of Your Child 
“Until well into the twentieth century, the law purported to draw a sharp 
line between physical injury and property loss on the one hand, and mental dis-
tress and relational harm on the other.”104 A legal claim existed for the physical 
injury and the property loss, but not the mental distress or the relational 
harm.105 The main historical reason for the distinction was a fear of fraudulent 
                                                                                                                                
Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649 (N.Y. 2004); Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252, 256 
(Me. 1988); Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 237 (Va. 1986). Texas law is more compli-
cated than most. Texas’s wrongful death statute has a specific exception for stillbirth due to 
medical malpractice. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(c)(4) (West 2017). If 
the stillbirth is due to a car accident, a wrongful death claim exists. Fort Worth Osteopathic 
Hosp. Inc., v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 100 (Tex. 2004). But if it is due to medical malpractice, 
only a negligence claim exists. Id. Notably, the medical malpractice negligence claim is sub-
ject to a much smaller damage cap than the medical malpractice wrongful death claim. This 
may seem like a small amount of states, but the group includes the four most populous 
states—California, Texas, Florida, and New York. These four states had approximately 34 
percent of all live births in 2016. See infra notes 246–250 and accompanying text. A larger 
proportion of pregnancies and births also likely means a larger proportion of stillbirths. 
101  See infra Section B. 
102  See infra Section II.B. 
103  This section uses empirical research of parents after stillbirth to help illustrate how tort 
law devalues stillbirth. This research is about stillbirth generally—unexplained stillbirth, un-
preventable stillbirth, and tortiously caused stillbirth. Tortiously caused stillbirth could cause 
a different sort of grief—maybe having someone to blame worsens or lessens the grief. The 
fact that tortious conduct caused the stillbirth may also lessen some anxiety involved with a 
subsequent pregnancy, but maybe not. I specifically did not cite any research concerning the 
blame mothers place on themselves after stillbirth because, theoretically, mothers would not 
blame themselves if someone else tortiously caused the stillbirth. Regardless, it is important 
to note that the studies are not specific to parents after tortiously caused stillbirth. 
104  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 491. 
105  Id. at 491–92, 500. Before briefly reviewing that history, a few clarifications are neces-
sary. First, tort law has never limited the recovery of emotional distress damages if that emo-
tional distress was a result of a physical contact or harm. Thus, if a stillbirth is the result of 
intentional physical beating, the mother’s emotional distress is recoverable in a battery 
claim. See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (affirming the 
award of damages for embarrassment “without the necessity of showing actual physical inju-
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claims given the theoretical ease of feigning an emotional injury.106 Eventually, 
courts recognized recovery for mental distress, but only in limited circumstanc-
es.107 The modern main reason for the limitation is fear of disproportionate lia-
bility.108 A defendant’s tortious conduct may cause many people emotional dis-
tress and tort law does not want the defendant to be liable ten times for one 
conduct. Regardless of the reasons, the physical-mental/-emotional injury dis-
tinction remains a part of tort law. 
Tort law thus requires classification, but stillbirth is not easily classified.  
Many courts have had a particularly difficult time seeing and categorizing the 
physical and emotional connection between a mother and fetus. The intertwined 
physical and emotional nature of the response of a women who experiences a 
. . . stillbirth does not seem to fit neatly into the standard repertoire of injuries 
suffered by torts plaintiffs.109 
Still, courts could have easily treated stillbirth as physical. “In a very real 
sense, these plaintiffs suffered physical injuries.”110 Stillbirth also easily fits 
within the definition of “bodily harm,” required for a battery claim, an inten-
tional tort.111 Despite stillbirth involving something physical to the mother, 
courts opted to treat the injury as emotional. The cases were “fixed on fright, 
the mechanism of the injury, rather than on the ultimate physical consequences 
of the defendant’s actions.”112 
Feminist legal scholars suggest the main reason courts opted to treat still-
birth as emotional was because it happened to women.113 They connected tort 
law’s historical resistance to recognizing emotional injuries to tort law’s re-
sistance to recognizing injuries that happen to women. Feminist legal scholars 
Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber noted that the connection “was forged in 
the law of torts from the beginning” “[b]ecause the plaintiffs in each of the 
prominent early cases were women . . .”114 
                                                                                                                                
ry”). Similarly, if a stillbirth is the result of a car accident in which the mother was also 
physically injured, her emotional distress would also be recoverable against the negligent 
driver. 
106  See Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 493. 
107  Id. at 491–92. 
108  See id. at 494. 
109  MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, 
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 103 (2010). 
110  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 525. 
111  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“There is an impair-
ment of the physical condition of another’s body if the structure or function of any part of 
the other’s body is altered to any extent even though the alteration causes no other harm.”). 
112  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 525. 
113  See, e.g., Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of 
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 824 (1990). 
114  Id. at 815, 824 (“Historically . . . women have tended to bring claims for fright-based 
injuries far more often than for men.”). Scholars have also made a connection between gen-
der and cultural devaluation of stillbirth: “Gender politics is, therefore, at the core of issues 
related to stillbirth: how society defines stillbirth, the policies related to the acknowledge-
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Three distinct types of harms are embedded within these early suits for fright-
based injuries: (1) physical injuries, including miscarriages, stillbirths, and hys-
teria-caused disabilities; (2) emotional distress, often necessitating long periods 
of bed rest; and (3) the relational harm of losing a potential child.115 
In the early cases, courts’ treatment of these cases reveals a devaluing of 
the injury because of its gendered nature. In 1897, a Massachusetts court denied 
recovery to a woman because only “a timid or sensitive person” would suffer 
such an injury.116 A New York court denied recovery to a woman in 1896 be-
cause her fright was not a legally cognizable injury, even though it also alleged-
ly caused her to miscarry.117 
The earliest rule allowing recovery, the impact rule, allowed a plaintiff to 
recover for her emotional distress if she was also physically impacted in some 
way.118 That physical impact supposedly verified claims for emotional dis-
tress.119 But it did not allow recovery in a near-miss situation—if the train just 
missed hitting the plaintiff. Later, a majority of states adopted a different “dan-
ger zone” rule for those near-miss situations, allowing the plaintiff to recover 
for her emotional distress resulting from “fear for her own personal safety.”120 
Neither the impact nor the zone of danger rule, however, addressed situations 
where the plaintiff suffered emotional distress due to seeing someone else in-
jured. 
The California Supreme Court later created a rule allowing recovery in 
such a situation. In Dillon v. Legg, a mother suffered emotional distress due to 
witnessing her daughter be negligently killed.121 The Court adopted a rule ena-
bling recovery for a bystander depending on whether the emotional injury was 
foreseeable.122 Foreseeability will depend on the plaintiff’s witnessing the di-
rect victim’s injury and the closeness of the relationship between the direct vic-
tim and the bystander.123 The Dillon v. Legg bystander test is the current major-
                                                                                                                                
ment of the life of the stillborn baby, and the social acceptance of these policies.” Cacciatore, 
Sociopolitical, supra note 39, at 379. 
115  Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 824. More modern examples of devaluation of a 
woman’s injury associated with pregnancy or childbirth can be found in Elizabeth Kukura, 
Obstetric Violence, 106 GEO. L.J. 721, 753 (2018); Jamie R. Abrams, The Illusion of Auton-
omy in Women’s Medical Decision-Making, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2014); and Jamie 
R. Abrams, Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955, 
1983 (2013). 
116  Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 828–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Spade v. Lynn & B.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88, 88 (Mass. 1897)). 
117  See id. at 828 (discussing Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 35 (N.Y. 1896)). 
118  See id. at 819. 
119  Id. (“The rule allowed courts to indulge in the fiction that an injury traceable to fright 
was only ‘parasitic’ to damage stemming from physical impact,” and theoretically limited 
recovery to claims for “material” harms.). 
120  Id. at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121  Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968). 
122  Id. at 920. 
123  Id. 
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ity and theoretically most liberal rule enabling recovery for emotional dis-
tress.124 Feminist legal scholars have argued that Dillon “signifies that the law 
regards a mother’s anguish at witnessing the death or injury of her child as a 
harm that qualifies for legal protection.”125 
Regardless of which test used, many states also required, and still require, 
that the plaintiff’s emotional distress manifest physically.126 Professors Cha-
mallas and Kerber explain that this requirement “is the modern descendant of 
the impact rule” and its purposes are to “guard against fraudulent claims, to 
limit recovery to serious injuries, and to discourage plaintiffs who suffer only 
transient harm from filing suit.”127 This requirement was not difficult for many 
female plaintiffs in early cases as women often alleged that their emotional dis-
tress caused loss of pregnancy. Pregnancy loss, both miscarriage and stillbirth, 
was so frequently claimed “that it has come to typify” claims for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.128 
Thus, the first major recognition of stillbirth in tort was as a “physical 
problem [that] indicates an underlying emotional problem,”129 a physical symp-
tom verifying the preceding emotional distress. Other physical symptoms that 
courts have found to sufficiently manifest emotional distress include a rash,130 
vomiting,131 and a loss of bladder control.132 In no way is stillbirth similar to a 
rash, vomiting, or loss of bladder control. But tort law treats them all the 
same—as physical manifestations of the emotional distress plaintiffs allegedly 
suffer. This strong historical association between pregnancy loss and the physi-
cal manifestation rule devalues stillbirth as an injury. 
The classification of stillbirth as an emotional injury has led to some awk-
ward applications of the impact, danger zone, and Dillon rules to negligently 
caused stillbirth.133 Florida adopted an exception to the impact rule to allow a 
claim for negligent causation of stillbirth.134 Pennsylvania follows the danger 
zone rule; because of its difficult application to stillbirth, the Pennsylvania Su-
                                                        
124  See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 821–22. 
125  Id. at 860. 
126  See id. at 820–21 (“Most jurisdictions have retained the requirement; only a minority of 
states, most notably California, have eliminated it. These more liberal states allow recovery 
for negligent infliction of serious mental distress, even if unaccompanied by physical mani-
festations or illness.”). 
127  Id. at 820. 
128  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 363 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see also DOBBS, supra note 98, at 837 (using miscarriage as an 
example of a “subsequent physical harm . . . resulting from the emotional distress . . .”). 
129  Lopez v. Geico Ins. Co., No. CIV 11-633 GBW/RHS, 2012 WL 12840821, at *4 
(D.N.M. June 5, 2012). 
130  Id. (explaining that a “rash could be said to indicate the reality of the emotional dis-
tress.”). 
131  See Marchica v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 F.3d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1994). 
132  DOBBS, supra note 98, at 838. 
133  The application is even more awkward for the father’s claim. See infra Section C. 
134  See Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997). 
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preme Court opted to recognize a wrongful death claim.135 Applying Dillon to 
stillbirth is the least awkward, but it does result in characterizing the mother as 
a “bystander” to the negligent conduct, even though it happened to her, as the 
Nebraska Supreme Court did.136 
Some courts have more recently treated stillbirth as physical injury. The 
likely motivation is the difficulty of applying the three emotional distress rules 
to cases involving stillbirth. Texas law treats stillbirth just like any other “per-
sonal injury action[],” as personal physical injury includes “the loss of [her] fe-
tus.”137 Florida law classifies a “fetus” as “living tissue of the body,” providing 
the “mother . . . a legal cause of action the same as she has for a wrongful inju-
ry to any other part of her body.”138 These explanations show that the courts did 
not suddenly grasp the gravity of stillbirth. To the contrary, the holdings make 
the death of an unborn baby commensurate with injury to the leg, just a differ-
ent version of devaluation. 
Other modern courts still struggle with the physical versus emotional clas-
sification of stillbirth. Until 2004, New York law required a plaintiff mother to 
demonstrate a physical injury to herself “distinct from that suffered by the fetus 
and not a normal incident to childbirth” before she could recover damages for 
her emotional distress.139 New York also did not and still does not recognize a 
wrongful death claim,140 meaning a mother had no legal recourse if her doctor 
negligently caused a stillbirth. Finally—in 2004, less than fifteen years ago—
the highest New York court recognized recovery after stillbirth “even in the ab-
sence of an independent injury . . .”141 
Even if allowed to pursue a claim for the death of their unborn babies, 
courts still manage to devalue the mother’s injury in their characterizations of 
unborn babies—as fetuses. A New York court described the parents’ lost child 
                                                        
135  See Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1092 (Pa. 1985) (Zappala, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that it is “hard to conceive how either of these parents, especially the father, could bring 
himself within even the most expansive rule allowing recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress”). 
136  See Andreasen v. Gomes, N.W.2d 539, 542 (Neb. 1993). But see Sesma v. Cueto, 129 
Cal. App. 3d 108, 115, n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“It is unreasonable to label a woman in la-
bor a ‘bystander’ as to any injury suffered by her fetus, considering the intimate physical and 
psychic connection between them.”). 
137  See Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 481–82 (Tex. 1995). But see id. at 483 
(Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff mother did not allege any physical injury). 
138  Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988). In the same opinion, the 
Court showed confusion in trying to classify the baby: “An unborn fetus is either a new and 
separate human being or ‘person,’ temporarily residing within the womb of the host mother, 
OR it is a part of the mother’s body, OR both.” Id. at 847. 
139  CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 103. See, e.g., Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 
1085, 1088 (Pa. 1985) (explaining that “[t]he parents’ pain and suffering caused by their 
child’s negligent death has never been recoverable unless the pain and suffering was accom-
panied by or a result of a physical injury to the parent” but separately recognizing a wrongful 
death claim). 
140  See Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648 (N.Y. 2004). 
141  Id. at 649. 
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as “stillborn full-term fetus.”142 A California court described that the mother 
“does not recall whether she heard or saw the fetus.”143 Courts also frequently 
use phrases like “the fetus” and “it” despite the gender of the baby assuredly 
being known.144 In a Florida case, the doctor objected to the parents’ references 
to their baby as “their son,” “their child,” or by his name, George, Jr.145 The 
appellate court correctly found no error in these references because they 
demonstrated the parents’ mental distress.146 Still, the appellate court did find 
error in the inclusion of “George Hurley, Jr.” on the verdict form and in the ju-
ry instructions.147 The appellate court also suggested that “fetus” would have 
been a more “precise” description of the plaintiffs’ son.148 
The same devaluing characterizations are also found in wrongful death 
claims. As this Article argues, a wrongful death claim is the proper claim to use 
for stillbirth because it recognizes that stillbirth is no different than the death of 
a living child; tort law provides a wrongful death for the tortious death of a liv-
ing child and should provide the same claim for tortiously caused stillbirth. But 
the recognition is superficial as courts often still use language that devalues 
stillbirth as just the death of a fetus. As an example, in the same case in which 
it recognized a wrongful death claim, the Montana Supreme Court described 
the full-term unborn baby—who was actually over 40 weeks gestational age—
as a fetus.149 Other examples include Hawaii and Idaho courts that have applied 
their states’ wrongful death claims to the deaths of “twin fetuses” and a “viable 
unborn fetus.”150 
                                                        
142  Scott v. Capital Area Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 
(“stillborn full-term fetus”). 
143  Sesma v. Cueto, 129 Cal. App. 3d 108, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (describing that the 
mother “does not recall whether she heard or saw the fetus”). 
144  See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 706–708 (Fla. 1997) (describing a claim for 
negligent stillbirth as “directed toward the death of a fetus” as opposed to the death of a liv-
ing person); De Jesus v. Mishra, 93 A.D.3d 135, 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (noting descrip-
tions including that “the fetus’s heart had conclusively ceased beating” and “that the fetus 
had irretrievably expired at that time”); Rupp v. Brown, 31 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2000) (explaining that mother alleged she suffered “mental anguish over the loss of the fe-
tus” and when “scheduling problems caused her to carry a dead fetus in her womb for two 
days”). 
145  See Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The appellate 
court found no error in the trial court’s allowing these references. Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 979. 
148  Id. at 978 (emphasis added). 
149  See Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730, 733 (Mont. 1994). 
150  See Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1576 (D. Haw. 1990) (interpreting Ha-
waii’s wrongful death statute to include a claim for a deceased “fetus” and referring to the 
deceased twin babies as “twin fetuses”); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (Idaho 1982) 
(recognizing wrongful death claim for the tortious death of a “viable unborn fetus” and not 
once using the word baby); see also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922a (2018) (providing 
a wrongful death or negligence claim for “physical injury to or the death of the embryo or 
fetus”); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing a 
wrongful death claim for the death of an unborn baby and referring to that baby as a fetus); 
19 NEV. L.J. 955, LENS 5/28/2019  10:29 AM 
976 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
 
Another devaluing description of stillbirth is found in a common limitation 
on damages recoverable in negligence claims, allowing damages for the “men-
tal anguish . . . resulting from negligent treatment that causes the loss of a fetus 
as part of the women’s body,” but refusing damages for “the loss of a fetus as 
an individual.”151 The distinction attempts to distinguish between the loss of a 
baby as a part of the woman’s body versus just as a baby. What exactly is the 
difference?152 The baby was both part of the woman’s body and yet an individ-
ual, precluding a distinction. Consider the additional anguish that will result 
when the mother’s body starts to produce milk a few days after birth. This 
hormonal process is yet another cruel reminder that her baby died, as her 
breasts fill up with milk with no baby to breastfeed. It is anguishing.153 But is it 
part of losing the “fetus” as a part of the mother’s body, or as a separated baby? 
It is a hormonal response to the departure of the “fetus” from the mother’s 
body, but the purpose of that hormonal response is to feed a living baby. In-
stead of just focusing on compensating the mother for her obvious injury, these 
forced distinctions make no attempt to understand the injury that is stillbirth.154 
Devaluation can also be nonverbal. That occurs when courts exclude pic-
tures of stillborn babies at trial. Naturally, a picture of a stillborn child is a pic-
ture of a dead child. In the nineteenth century, post-mortem photography was 
                                                                                                                                
Castro v. Melchor, 366 P.3d 1058, 1067 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 
619 P.2d 826, 830 (N.M. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 495 (N.C. 1987). 
But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (2018) (recognizing wrongful death claim for “the 
death of a person or an unborn child”). 
151  Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); see also Burgess v. Su-
perior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1084–85 (Cal. 1992); Smith v. Borello, 804 A.2d 1151, 1163 
(Md. 2002); Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 235–37 (Va. 1986). 
152  Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 489 (Tex. 1995) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court is asking the trier of fact to do the impossible: ascertain damages for mental 
anguish to the mother ‘as a result of the occurrence in question’ yet unrelated to the baby’s 
death.”). “It will not be surprising if the foregoing instructions and definitions profoundly 
confuses juries, attorneys, and trial and appellate courts.” Id. 
153  See Position Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 2 (Aug. 2016), 
available at http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PLIDA_PositionStatement_L 
actationIssuesFollowingLoss.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TZG-EXXY] (“Whether or not lactation 
is expected, the grief experienced by a mother who is not able to breastfeed or offer breast 
milk to her baby is profound.”); see also Joanne Cacciatore, The Unique Experiences of 
Women and Their Families After the Death of a Baby, 49 SOC. WORK HEALTH CARE 134, 
142 (2010) [hereinafter Cacciatore, Unique] (“There is often a powerful, evolutionary impe-
tus to nurture the baby who died. The emotional state derived from maternal hormones is 
incongruent with her reality as she cannot physically bond with her baby.”). 
154  Another difficult scenario would be the surrogacy context. Presumably, only the preg-
nant woman would be able to recover damages because the fetus was part of her body, but 
not the actual parents. That does not make sense though as the expectant parents would like-
ly be more apt to suffer injury than the pregnant woman. And what if the baby in the preg-
nant surrogate was made from the parents’ egg and sperm? Would then the fetus actually be 
a part of the expectant mother’s body even though the fetus is not literally inside that ex-
pectant mother? 
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common, and pictures of deceased children were comforting to parents.155 The 
“photographs of children brought the living child’s face and form back to their 
parents.”156 But then cameras became more common and parents could be com-
forted by pictures of their child when still alive—“taking and displaying pic-
tures of the dead was [then] seen as unseemly rather than respectful.”157 This 
sentiment feeds well into the legal standards courts use in determining whether 
to admit photographs—how “gruesome” photographs could unfairly prejudice 
the jury.158 A photo of a stillborn baby has an inherent “gruesomeness” to it; it 
is a picture of a dead baby. Not surprisingly, numerous courts have excluded 
pictures of stillborn babies.159 
Professor Carol Sanger hinted at this inherent gruesomeness in her descrip-
tion of postmortem photography of stillborn babies, describing that the photos 
are “[c]arefully lit portraits sensitive to the baby’s often distressed physical 
condition . . . .”160 This assumption of distress is likely due to the inaccurate as-
sumption that stillbirth is unpreventable, possibly due to some sort of abnor-
mality.161 Stillborn babies are unlikely to look any more distressed than living 
ones, however. Both are cleaned before given to the mother. Especially if full-
term, stillborn babies just look like sleeping babies.162 And even if not full-
term, a stillborn baby at only twenty-five weeks will look like a living, sleep-
ing, premature baby of the same gestational age, a picture of which would not 
be seen as gruesome. 
The picture is one of the only things parents have to prove the baby’s exist-
ence.163 The photo provides a “record of social identity for parent and for 
                                                        
155  See CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 140 (2017). 
156  Id. at 136. 
157  Sanger, supra note 59, at 285. 
158  See Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 927 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (discussing Rule 
403’s admissibility test of weighing probative value versus prejudicial effect and that grue-
someness of photos does not automatically make them inadmissible). 
159  See, e.g., Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 930–31 (1st Cir. 1991) (af-
firming discretionary exclusion from evidence of “inflammatory,” “gruesome” photographs 
of stillborn fetus in medical malpractice action against doctor and hospital); Steele v. Atlanta 
Maternal-Fetal Med., P.C., 610 S.E.2d 546, 553–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming discre-
tionary exclusion of “emotionally provocative” and “inflammatory” photographs of stillborn 
fetus on grounds that their “slight probative value was substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice.”); Kelly v. Al-Qulali, 728 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (affirm-
ing discretionary exclusion from evidence of photographs of stillborn fetus offered as evi-
dence on loss of consortium claim). 
160  SANGER, supra note 155, at 136 (emphasis added). 
161  See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (describing and dispelling the myth that 
stillbirth is unpreventable). 
162  See Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 927 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (describing the 
photographs as “show[ing] what appears to be a sleeping, fully-clothed or covered, newborn 
infant.”). 
163  LAYNE, supra note 3, at 99 (explaining that pictures of stillborn babies “play a critical 
role in establishing the reality of the baby.”); see id. at 127 (explaining the importance of the 
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child.”164 The picture also proves that the baby was in fact a baby—not just a 
fetus, a distinction relevant to the extent of the parents’ loss and jury’s determi-
nation of damages. “Unduly sterilizing a party’s trial presentation can unfairly 
hamper her ability to shape a compelling and coherent exposition of the 
facts.”165 Parents can testify about their loss, but, especially due to misconcep-
tions about stillbirth, only the picture can really communicate their loss.166 
Even if the baby is distressed physically, only the picture can show the jury that 
even a stillborn baby is a baby. 
That tort law treats stillbirth as less than the death of a child is not surpris-
ing given that the dominant cultural view is the same. Stillbirth is “a terrible 
loss,” but not the same as losing a child.167 Even physicians, in one study, ex-
plained stillbirth as “like . . . losing a family member,” as opposed to actually 
losing a family member.168 If the baby had survived birth and later died, that 
was a loss of a family member. But if the baby did not survive birth, the death 
was not of a family member. The deaths are not “equivalent.”169 “While most 
infant and child deaths are socially recognized as traumatic and worthy of 
mourning, stillbirth is generally treated as a non-event that is not as weighty as 
the death of a live-born child.”170 
The deaths are different because the stillborn baby never took a breath out-
side of the womb. “The metaphor of taking that first breath in the world carries 
strong moral significance for many people . . . .”171 A baby born premature at 
25 weeks who later dies was a member of the family, but a full-term stillborn 
baby who never takes that first breath is not. In reality, “at the end of gestation-
al development,” the cutoff of a first breath “makes little sense medically and is 
essentially arbitrary.”172 But still, that first breath is paramount. Parents’ 
“mourning experience” after the death of an infant, even a premature infant, is 
validated, but grieving after stillbirth “is generally decried by society in gen-
eral.”173 
                                                                                                                                
baby’s footprints because they represent “not only generic humanness but the idea of the 
unique individuality of each person.”). 
164  SANGER, supra note 155, at 140. 
165  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 314 (3d Cir. 2004). 
166  See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 295 (2013) (dis-
cussing the emphasis in evidence law on “the importance of narrative richness and each 
side’s opportunity to shape the moral force of its case,” partially necessary because “jurors 
have preexisting conceptions about stories that affect how they process evidence . . .”). 
167  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 12. 
168  Id. at 13; see also Cacciatore et al., Ambiguity, supra note 90, at 444 (explaining that 
“people will not acknowledge the child who died at birth as a member of the family.”). 
169  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 10. 
170  Joanne Cacciatore et al., Condemning Self, Condemning Other: Blame and Mental 
Health in Women Suffering Stillbirth, 35 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 342, 343 (2013) 
(internal citations omitted). 
171  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13. 
172  Id. 
173  Cacciatore, Feminist, supra note 71, at 91. 
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But to parents, stillbirth is no different than infant death. “[P]arents de-
scribe the grief of stillbirth as being just as deep, painful, and significant as it 
would be to lose an infant who is born and survives a few weeks in intensive 
care.”174 When asked what “they most wanted the general public to know about 
stillbirth and how it affects families,” parents overwhelmingly answered that “a 
stillbirth is a death in the family.”175 Plainly, stillbirth is the death of your 
child.176 Whether the child—who has a name,177 who “is real and will always 
be remembered as part of the[] family”178—took a breath outside of the womb 
is irrelevant to the extent of the parents’ loss.179 
And it is the parents’ loss that tort law is attempting to compensate. The 
best way for tort law to do so is to recognize a wrongful death claim, allowing 
parents the same recourse they already have if their living child dies due to tort. 
Appropriate damages may very differ depending on if the child is unborn or 
twelve years old, but a wrongful death claim should be available for both un-
necessary deaths. 
Importantly, within that wrongful death claim, tort law must be careful to 
not minimize the parents’ loss, which is exactly what happens when the court 
describes the unborn baby as a fetus.180 True, medically speaking, an unborn 
baby is a “fetus” until birth. But doctors and nurses rarely use the term “fetus” 
in a desired pregnancy. “[M]edical professionals are more likely to socially 
support the attribution of ‘baby’ or ‘child’ status to the fetus;”181 at the ultra-
sound, the doctor points out the baby’s foot, not the fetus’s foot. It is only if 
“something goes wrong,” like a stillbirth, that “the medical terminology is 
quickly redeployed”182 and the baby is only a fetus. 
But even if doctors were actually consistent in their use of “fetus,” 
“[m]edical terminology provides definitions and benchmarks for biological 
stages of prenatal development, but it does not tell us what the word ‘fetus’ 
means in other contexts,”183 or whether the word “fetus” is even applicable in 
other contexts. Stillbirth is a different context. No legal reason exists requiring 
                                                        
174  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 10. 
175  DEFRAIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 127–28. 
176  Joanne Cacciatore & Jill Wieber Lens, The Ultimate in Women’s Labor: Rethinking 
Feminism Around Pregnancy, Birthing, and Grieving a Dead Baby, in ROUTLEDGE 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WOMEN’S SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (Jane M. Ussh-
er, Joan C. Chrisler, Janette Perz, eds., forthcoming 2019) (describing stillbirth as the death 
of a child). 
177  DEFRAIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 61 (“The overwhelming majority of parents (nearly 90 
percent) considered the baby a part of the family and named the baby.”). 
178  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 10, 12. 
179  Id. at 13. 
180  See id. 
181  Victoria Browne, Feminist Philosophy and Prenatal Death: Relationality and the Ethics 
of Intimacy, 41 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 385, 402 (2016). 
182  Id. 
183  SANGER, supra note 155, at 73. 
19 NEV. L.J. 955, LENS 5/28/2019  10:29 AM 
980 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
 
courts to devalue stillbirth by calling the unborn baby a fetus or requiring 
courts to exclude pictures, the one piece of evidence that the baby was more 
than a fetus. “Most [parents] refer to the loss as a baby,”184 who has a name, 
and many parents of stillbirth just want to hear that name said out loud.185 
Courts should similarly use the name that the parents chose, like the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court did by calling the baby Brianna,186 or the Alabama Supreme 
Court recently did by calling the unborn baby Tristian.187 
B. No Lost Parent-Child Relationship 
Relational injuries can be based either on the changing of the relationship 
or the ending of it. For instance, a relationship is necessarily changed if a 
spouse or child is severely injured. Second, a relationship is completely lost if 
the family member dies. Tort law treats these two extents of relational injuries 
differently.188 The potential relational injury in stillbirth is the relationship lost 
to death, the lost parent-child relationship. 
A relational injury is different than general emotional distress or mental 
anguish. Professor Joellen Lind eloquently explained this distinction in the con-
text of a wrongful death of a child. The lost relationship includes the lost op-
portunities—the parent missing out on “read[ing] books to her, or teach[ing] 
her to ride a bicycle.”189 “[T]hese activities would have generated ongoing, oc-
current emotions, ideas, perceptions, and other experiences for both parties.”190 
But the loss is deeper than just opportunities. The parent-child relationship “as 
a totality would have affected the [parent’s] personality formation and devel-
opment, goals, and life course, and would have had other transfiguring conse-
quences.”191 Being a parent is one “of the most important roles we play in life,” 
a “role[] that can define in large part who we are.”192 
                                                        
184  Position Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 4 (Aug. 2016), avail-
able at http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PLIDA_BereavedParentsRighttoS 
elf-Determination.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHB8-WRCP]. 
185  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 9, 13 (explaining that the parents in the study “were 
emphatic that they wanted to talk about their children.”). 
186  Pierce v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 692 N.W.2d 558, 567 (Wis. 2005); see also Shat-
tuck v. Gulliver, 481 A.2d 1110 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (describing the stillborn baby as the 
parents’ “son”); Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 460 (Ind. 2011) (describing the death 
of the parents’ “full-term baby daughter” and as the parents’ “child”). 
187  See generally Hamilton v. Scott, No. 1150377, 2018 WL 1224234, at *14 (Ala. Mar. 9, 
2018). 
188  DOBBS, supra note 98, at 812 (explaining that the availability of loss of consortium dam-
ages for wrongful death depends on the state statute); id. at 842 (explaining the common law 
availability of loss of consortium damages for the injury of a family member, and that the 
availability of a claim for parents after a child’s injury is limited). 
189  Joellen Lind, Valuing Relationships: The Role of Damages for Loss of Society, 35 N.M. 
L. REV. 301, 305 (2005). 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 306. 
192  Id. 
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Tort law, however, just as it devalues emotional distress, also devalues re-
lational injuries. “Like emotional harms, relational injuries continue to rank at 
the bottom of the legal hierarchy of injuries. At different historical periods, cer-
tain relational claims have gained visibility, but there has never been wide-
spread legal protection for this type of injury.”193 The common law did not rec-
ognize relational injuries; it did not provide any claim for the relational injury 
that occurs when a family member dies due to tort.194 In the mid 1850’s, legis-
latures began creating wrongful death statutes, but still damages for the lost re-
lationship were not available because damages were statutorily limited to “pe-
cuniary” losses.195 Many thought it proper to limit damages to lost economic 
contributions because it was “consider[ed] . . . degrading and perhaps even 
immoral to evaluate human life and human relationships according to commer-
cial measures.”196 
A pecuniary measurement, however, automatically limits recovery for the 
deaths of certain groups of people. Essentially, “the death of someone not earn-
ing money—a child, an older person, a homemaker—resulted in little or no re-
covery.”197 In fact, economically, losing a child actually saved parents money. 
Many may have hesitated to “commodify the parent-child relationship by plac-
ing a monetary value on children’s lives,”198 but a pecuniary-only measure de-
values that same relationship. 
Gradually, legislatures and courts expanded recovery for wrongful death to 
include damages for loss of society and companionship, more simply put as the 
loss of the relationship.199 The damages are called loss of consortium damages. 
A parent’s damages after a child’s wrongful death are called loss of filial con-
sortium damages.200 Even today, however, loss of consortium damages are not 
guaranteed. Loss of spousal consortium damages are uncontroversial, but states 
still pause at whether to award loss of parental or filial consortium damages.201 
If the state recognizes only a negligence claim after stillbirth, the mother’s re-
covery is limited to mental anguish damages; loss of filial consortium damages 
are not available. 
Just as they did for emotional injuries, feminist legal scholars suggest a 
main reason courts historically and still today devalue the injury of lost rela-
                                                        
193  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 500. 
194  STUART M. SPEISER, 1 RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 28 (2d ed. 1975). 
195  DOBBS, supra note 98, at 808. 
196  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 497. 
197  DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 674 (2d ed. 
1993). 
198  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 497. 
199  See DOBBS, supra note 98, at 812. 
200  See, e.g., Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 54 S.W.3d 234, 237 
(Tenn. 2001) (allowing recovery of loss of filial consortium damages in wrongful death 
claim). 
201  See id. at 237 n.2 (noting that thirty-two states allow recovery of filial consortium dam-
ages in a wrongful death claim). 
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tionship, especially the lost child-parent relationship, is because of the associa-
tion of that injury with women. Professors Chamallas and Wriggins specifically 
describe that “an important relational element [existed for] the bystander claim 
that flowed from the fact that it was often the injured party’s family member 
who was on hand to witness the injury and suffer distress as a result.”202 Really, 
the claim was “primarily a way to vindicate damage to a relationship . . . most 
prominently, maternal ties to children—than with compensating for nervous 
shock and trauma.”203 
This association between mothers and relational injuries, then, according to 
feminist legal theory, explains why “[a]t different historical periods, certain re-
lational claims have gained visibility, but there has never been widespread legal 
protection for this type of injury.”204 And still today, “[c]onsistent protection 
for loss of consortium of children, parents, grandparents, and siblings is notably 
lacking.”205 
Tort law is already reluctant to recognize the parent’s relational injury 
when a living child dies. It is no surprise that tort law then tends to devalue the 
relational injury after stillbirth, when the association to women is even stronger 
because the child was still in the mother’s womb. The California Supreme 
Court explained that: 
The parents of a stillborn fetus have never known more than a mysterious pres-
ence dimly sensed by random movements in the womb; but the mother and fa-
ther of a child born alive have seen, touched, and heard their baby, have wit-
nessed his developing personality, and have started the lifelong process of 
communicating and interacting with him.206 
Said another way, the “rich experiences upon which a meaningful parent-
child relationship is built . . . do not begin until the moment of birth.”207 An Il-
linois appellate court similarly explained that “[i]n the death of an unborn fetus, 
no guidance, love, affection or security has been exchanged. While parents may 
love and have affection for an unborn child, the child cannot be said to have re-
turned such affection.”208 The court acknowledged that little difference exists 
between stillbirth and the death of a child moments after birth, but believed 
the initial bonding which takes place at birth cannot be dismissed so easily. The 
length, intensity and quality of the parent-child relationship are determinative of 
the loss experienced by the parent. Certainly, birth is a proper point at which to 
begin to measure the loss of a child’s society.209 
                                                        
202  CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 113. 
203  Id. at 116. 
204  Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 500. 
205  Id. at 502. 
206  Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 133 (Cal. 1977). 
207  Id. 
208  Hunt v. Chettri, 510 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
209  Id.; see also Denham v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (N.D. Ill. 
1988) (“Unborn Baby Hughes had not been born at the time of his death. Therefore, his fa-
19 NEV. L.J. 955, LENS 5/28/2019  10:29 AM 
Spring 2019] DEVALUATION OF STILLBIRTH 983 
 
Professor Steven Smith also once noted a similar distinction between a rela-
tionship that existed with a living child and a relationship that could have exist-
ed with a child never born. “[I]t is far easier to visualize what was at stake 
when the concrete particulars—the first steps and the birthday parties and the 
heart-to-heart talks—are actual memories and not just conceptual possibili-
ties.”210 Any lost anticipatory joys—“seeing a child grow, taking care of her, 
teaching her, playing with her”—“will have a hazy, impersonal aspect; there is 
no actual child with a particular giggle, with dimples and unruly hair and a 
homely toothless grin, for the couple’s reflections to distill around.”211 
Tort law’s devaluation of the lost unborn child-parent relationship is con-
sistent with the dominant cultural view that stillbirth is not really that devastat-
ing because the parents had not yet bonded with the child. “Some view [still-
birth] as a reproductive loss and not the death of a child—they may feel that 
since the parents did not experience the child outside the mother’s body, there 
was minimal attachment or love.”212 This view is apparent in another odd reac-
tion to stillbirth—that the parents should be thankful it was not an older child 
that died, or thankful that the death happened before the parents brought the 
baby home and got a chance to bond with him.213 It is why “parents’ grief and 
mourning are often felt to be ‘abnormal,’ since others cannot readily see the at-
tachment that existed between parent and child before birth.”214 
But even if the pre-birth parent-child relationship “is not appreciated” “so-
cially [or] even medically,” it exists.215 “[M]ost women and many parents do in 
                                                                                                                                
ther and brother cannot recover for the ‘loss of society’ of Unborn Baby Hughes.”); DiDona-
to v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494 (N.C. 1987) (“When a child is stillborn we simply can-
not know anything about its personality and other traits relevant to what kind of companion 
it might have been and what kind of services it might have provided. An award of damages 
covering these kinds of losses would necessarily be based on speculation rather than rea-
son”). 
210  Stephen D. Smith, Missing Persons, 2 NEV. L.J. 590, 603 (2002); see Malinda L. Sey-
more, Grasping Fatherhood in Abortion and Adoption, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 817, 853 (2017) 
(discussing that “[a]doption law does not allow mothers to relinquish parental rights prior to 
the birth of the child” because the “law recognizes that the baby may not seem real to the 
mother until after the child is born . . .”); see also John Roger Mann, Note, The Fetus as a 
Person in Wrongful Death Actions, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 895, 903 (1986) (“Those interests 
protected by wrongful death statutes—earning ability, consortium, comfort, society, guid-
ance, and companionship—are the existing qualities of actual persons. The fetus, as a poten-
tial person, has no existing ‘personal’ qualities for which survivors can be compensated, only 
the possibility of developing such protectable interests after birth.”); Note, The Impact of 
Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 557 
n.18 (1962) (advocating for wrongful death claim for stillbirth, but suggesting “the mental 
anguish of the parents may be greater in situations where they actually see the child before 
its death . . .”). 
211  Smith, supra note 210, at 602. 
212  Cacciatore, Unique, supra note 153, at 144. 
213  Id. 
214  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 420. 
215  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13. 
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fact bond with their baby over the 8 to 9 months of pregnancy.”216 “The theory 
of prenatal attachment posits that a unique relationship develops between par-
ents and fetus long before a child is born.”217 The bond is even more apprecia-
ble today due to medical advancements—blood tests to reveal gender as early 
as twelve weeks pregnant, and three-dimensional ultrasounds to better see the 
baby.218 Researchers introduced the notion of prenatal attachment as early as 
the 1940s and 1950s.219 The research continued and in the 1990s, researchers 
introduced attempts to measure the “extent of ‘the unique affectionate relation-
ship that develops between a woman and her foetus.’ ”220 The purposes of 
measurements include identifying women who may have difficulty further 
bonding with the baby after birth, which can have negative long-term effects 
for both the baby and mother.221 Regardless, decades of research confirms that 
a unique and affectionate relationship develops between parents and their child 
long before birth.222 
And that unique and affectional relationship is lost in stillbirth. Stillbirth 
undoubtedly causes parents mental anguish—especially when a mother has to 
deliver her child knowing that he has already died. But “mental anguish” simp-
ly “cannot speak to the enduringly disrupted life plans and transformed life ex-
                                                        
216  Id.; see also Julie F. Pallant et al., Psychometric Evaluation and Refinement of the Prena-
tal Attachment Inventory, 32 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 112, 112 (2014) (“The relation-
ship between a mother and child does not begin at birth, but develops throughout the preg-
nancy.”). 
217  Anna R. Brandon et al., A History of the Theory of Prenatal Attachment, 10 (NIH Public 
Access, 2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3083029/pdf/nihms184421.p 
df [https://perma.cc/23FT-MP5X]. 
218  LAYNE, supra note 3, at 93 (explaining that one way medical technologies “appear to be 
changing the experience of pregnancy loss” is by “changing the expectations regarding bio-
medicine’s abilities to guarantee a live birth.”). 
219  See generally Anna Maria Della Vedova et al., Assessing Prenatal Attachment in a Sam-
ple of Italian Women, 26 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 86 (2008) (mentioning research 
done by Deutsch and Winnicott describing the mother’s attachment to her unborn baby). 
220  Id. at 88. 
221  See Pallant et al., supra note 216, at 122. 
222  This research explains that prenatal bonding in desired pregnancies increases as the 
pregnancy progresses. See infra notes 374–75 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy 
claimed, without evidence, that “[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child . . . . it seems unexceptionable to conclude some 
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). His conclusion ignores the distinction be-
tween a desired and undesired pregnancy, and the fact that almost all abortions take place 
well before twenty weeks of pregnancy, the first point at which stillbirth is even possible. 
See infra notes 408–12 and accompanying text. Professor Maya Manian addressed this pa-
ternalistic speculative risk of regret. See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed 
Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 224–27 
(2009). 
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periences” due to stillbirth.223 Stillbirth is not just something the parents should 
be over within months or years. Grief based on the lost child-parent relation-
ship will continue. An injury based on a lost parent-child relationship is “by its 
nature, more a road not taken, more a whole form of life that is missed, than a 
harm that diminishes in degree.”224 Before stillbirth, the parent “had an oppor-
tunity to become a different person through the relationship—to occupy a spe-
cial role—but that opportunity is no more.”225 
“The death of a child by itself is transformative because it obliterates the 
parental role in regard to that child.”226 This transformation is especially drastic 
after stillbirth—“[t]he parents of a stillborn child probably have one of the 
hardest times of any bereaved adult dealing with the reality of the death and the 
permanence of changed expectations that it entails.”227 Research shows that 
parents, especially mothers, question their parenthood after stillbirth.228 “Even 
if they have older living children, the full scope of their parenthood is ambigu-
ous because most people will not acknowledge the child who died at birth as a 
member of the family.”229 After the baby’s death, “there are no tangible signs 
of parenthood . . . .”230 “[U]nlike a growing child or an adult, who leave behind 
a trail of existence, an unborn child lacks the material traces of social life.”231 If 
a stillborn baby is not a member of the family, then the parent is not really a 
parent. “Researchers have been keen to point out that parents will question how 
many children they have and, for the first-time parent, there is also the doubt 
about whether they are a mother or a father at all.”232 Parents are “rob[bed] [] of 
their identity as parents, based on the fact that their baby did not survive.”233 
Moreover, even if a parent-child relationship with an unborn baby is mere-
ly expected—which it is not as prenatal attachment demonstrates—its expected 
nature is not a reason to deny damages. Even with the death of a living child, 
much of the lost companionship is merely expected. Professor Lind specifically 
noted the expectation nature of consortium damages—although “loss-of-society 
damages depend on feelings and emotional bonds, they also exhibit the for-
ward-looking, expectation-based attributes of contract law.”234 This is because 
                                                        
223  See Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 171 (2017). “[M]ental 
anguish misrepresents the character of reproductive harms to decisional autonomy and indi-
vidual well-being.” Id. at 163. 
224  Lind, supra note 189, at 308. 
225  Id. at 306. 
226  Id. at 334. 
227  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 424. 
228  See Cacciatore, Unique, supra note 153, at 136–42. 
229  See Cacciatore et al., Ambiguity, supra note 90, at 444. 
230  Id. at 443–44. 
231  See Linda L. Layne, Breaking the Silence: An Agenda for a Feminist Discourse of Preg-
nancy Loss, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 289, 300 (1997). 
232  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 131. 
233  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13. 
234  Lind, supra note 189, at 305. 
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consortium “damages contemplate a developmental thing that would have 
flourished over time—a lost human interaction.”235 Additionally, remember the 
deeper layer of consortium damages that compensate a parent no longer being a 
parent, another future-looking expectation damage. Thus, even if the parent-
unborn child relationship is only “expected,” that lost expectation is exactly 
what consortium damages compensate. 
Parents are also robbed of more than hazy and impersonal anticipatory 
joys. Remember that current medical practice encourages parents to spend time 
with their stillborn baby.236 Parents will count his ten fingers and ten toes, 
touch his skin, and kiss him over and over. The baby will be both seen and 
touched. He is neither hazy nor impersonal, and neither will be parents’ hopes 
of his smile and giggles. Notably, Professor Smith’s point about “conceptual 
possibilities” and “hazy, impersonal” anticipatory joys concerned a couple’s 
decision to not have a child, a situation very different than stillbirth.237 Also, it 
is hard to see how the anticipatory joys will be any hazier after stillbirth than 
they would be after the death of an infant alive for mere days or months. 
“[S]tillborn infants count to these parents, and the love and sorrow the par-
ents feel are real.”238 The Iowa Supreme Court recognized so, noting that the 
lost relationship “does not necessarily relate to the child’s birth. And the par-
ents’ loss certainly does not vanish because the deprivation occurred prior to 
birth. To the deprived parent the loss is real either way.”239 An Arizona court 
similarly explained: 
Before the twins were born, the [parents] developed a relationship with them. 
They spoke, sang and read to them; they developed love for them and expecta-
tions for their future . . . . [A] parent’s loss of a child’s expected love and com-
panionship does not vanish simply because the child is lost before birth.240 
Social science research confirms that these courts are correct, and parents 
should be able to recover consortium damages because stillbirth severs the par-
ent-child relationship just like any other child death does. 
                                                        
235  Id. at 302; see also id. at 305 (explaining that consortium damages “focus on the missed 
opportunity of interacting over time with another in a significant relationship”). 
236  See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
237  Smith, supra note 210, at 602–03. 
238  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13. 
239  Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1983). 
240  Burnham v. Miller, 972 P.2d 645, 647 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 
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C. Devaluing the Father’s Injury241 
“[T]here should be little dispute that the stillbirth of a child as a result of 
medical negligence will be deeply hurtful to the mother, producing extraordi-
nary grief and anguish.”242 No one doubts that stillbirth is devastating for the 
mother. Professors Chamallas and Wriggins argue that courts were slow to rec-
ognize a negligence claim after stillbirth because of its gendered nature—the 
assumption that stillbirth, only, or at least most severely, injures the mother.243 
The gendered nature slowed down the recognition of a tort claim, and it contin-
ues to stunt the evolution of the tort claim—by denying claims for aggrieved 
fathers and non-biological parents. 
Whether a non-birth parent, including both fathers and non-biological par-
ents, should have a claim is a question for the states that recognize only a neg-
ligence claim. Any statutory wrongful death claim provides a claim for both 
parents, yet valid concerns should exist whether the father’s grief is still under-
estimated or discounted. But if only a negligence claim exists, state courts 
struggle with whether non-birth parents even have a claim after stillbirth. A few 
of those negligence-only states have specifically recognized the father’s 
claim.244 But others still refuse, or make the father’s claim much more difficult. 
                                                        
241  This section’s title refers to the father, as opposed to non-birth parents generally, only 
because the empirical research cited herein is specific to fathers. But the arguments apply 
equally as well to the non-birthing parent in a same-sex couple. See generally Joanne Cac-
ciatore & Zulma Raffo, An Exploration of Lesbian Maternal Bereavement, 56 SOC. WORK 
169 (2001) (explaining that bereavement of gay and lesbian couples after miscarriage, still-
birth, or child death has not been thoroughly studied). The legal and policy arguments, how-
ever, apply equally as well to any non-birth parent. Another commonly forgotten bereaved 
are siblings. See Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 130 (explaining that siblings 
“mourn both the baby and the loss of their previous relationship with their parents”); see also 
Position Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 4 (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PLIDA_PositionStatement_PrenancyAfte 
rPerinatalLossRequiresUniqueCare.pdf [https://perma.cc/28LY-NZQM] (“Children alive at 
the time of loss suffer two losses: the sibling they were expecting and the parents they knew 
before the loss. They live with parents whose behaviors are altered by intense grief . . . .”). 
Despite the verified grief, courts have refused siblings a claim: 
Although the children knew of the impending birth of a sibling, given their ages, 4 and 7, the re-
lationship between them and the fetus was, as a matter of law, not sufficiently developed to be 
regarded as an intimate familial one. The children simply lacked the life experiences required to 
enable them to appreciate the consequences of a stillbirth. 
Andreasen v. Gomes, 504 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Neb. 1993). 
242  Pierce v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 692 N.W.2d 558, 571 (Wisc. 2005) (Prosser, 
J., concurring). 
243  CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 104 (“To try to isolate a wholly separate 
injury to the mother—and to deny recovery when it is lacking—is a dramatic example of 
refusing to recognize an injury unless an identical harm can be suffered by a man.”). 
244  See, e.g., Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 709 (Fla. 1997); Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 
538 A.2d 252, 256 (Me. 1988); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 139 (N.J. 1988); Johnson 
v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 86–87 (N.C. 1990). 
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Those include populous states like Texas,245 New York,246 and California,247 
the three of which that made up almost 30 percent of all live births in the nation 
in 2016.248 Naturally, those states are also likely to have a significant portion of 
stillbirths,249 yet no or little recourse for fathers if the stillbirth is tortiously 
caused. 
The reason that a negligence claim for the non-birth parent is problematic 
is because of tort law’s limited recovery rules for emotional distress claims, the 
type of claim a father or non-birth parent has. As already discussed, tort law is 
hesitant to recognize recovery for emotional distress, and thus created specific 
limited liability duty rules discussed earlier—the impact rule (was the father 
impacted by the negligent conduct), the danger zone (was his physical safety at 
risk), or the Dillon test (did he witness the injury to his child).250 A father will 
usually neither be impacted by nor at physical risk from the tortious conduct. If 
he did not witness the injury, if he was not present at the car accident, he has no 
claim. Even if present for the stillbirth, that may not be enough.251 Also, a non-
birth parent does not physically deliver the baby, meaning some other physical 
manifestation must occur in order to recover.252 Further duty issues exist if the 
claim is for medical malpractice. Traditionally, the doctor owes a duty to the 
patient mother.253 Even if the non-birth parent witnesses the malpractice, if no 
duty is owed, no malpractice claim can exist. 
That said, none of the traditional fears related to expanding recovery for 
emotional distress apply. The injury is genuine, foreseeable, and liability would 
not be disproportionate. First, it is hard to doubt the genuineness of any par-
ent’s injury after stillbirth. Specific to non-birthing fathers, empirical research 
of parents after stillbirth demonstrates the genuineness of the injury, research 
that often refers to fathers as the “forgotten bereaved.”254 One reason fathers 
are forgotten is that their grief may be less apparent; “most men are socialized 
                                                        
245  Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. 1995). Texas recognizes a wrongful 
death claim for stillbirth due to tort other than medical malpractice. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 71.003 (West 2017). If due to medical malpractice, only a negligence claim is 
available. 
246  Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648–49 (N.Y. 2004). 
247  See Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 136 (Cal. 1977). Virginia also appears to only al-
low a claim for the mother. See generally Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va. 1986). 
248  See Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2016, 67 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 17, 
25–26 (2018). 
249  State by state stillbirth data is difficult because some states measure stillbirth by the 
weight of the baby and some by the gestational age of the baby. See Muthler, supra note 42. 
250  See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text. 
251  See infra notes 266–70 and accompanying text. 
252  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
253  See Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. 1995). 
254  Denise Côté-Arsenault & Joann O’Leary, Understanding the Experience of Pregnancy 
Subsequent to a Perinatal Loss, in PERINATAL AND PEDIATRIC BEREAVEMENT IN NURSING 
AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONS 159, 165 (Beth Perry Black et al. eds., 2015). 
19 NEV. L.J. 955, LENS 5/28/2019  10:29 AM 
Spring 2019] DEVALUATION OF STILLBIRTH 989 
 
not to discuss their feelings and to avoid emotionally charged situations.”255 
Despite appearance, fathers, like mothers, have “high levels of angst”256 and 
“significantly higher levels of depression”257 after stillbirth.258 Additionally, 
“bereaved fathers experience more anger while bereaved mothers struggle more 
with guilt.”259 The guilt that fathers do feel is most often related to their inabil-
ity to make the mothers feel better.260 “Fathers are in a difficult position [after a 
stillbirth] for a number of reasons: they are expected to take care of the wife 
emotionally; they are expected to continue to work and pay the bills; and they 
need to grieve for their lost baby themselves.”261 
Research shows that fathers “tended to return to work sooner and with 
fewer challenges than did the mothers.”262 The choice to quickly return to 
work, for either parent, may not be voluntary263; it is just the reality of needing 
to earn money to pay the bills.264 “After the death of a loved one, only 60 per-
cent of private sector workers get paid time off—and usually just a few 
days.”265 Statistics are unknown, but given the paucity of paid parental leave 
among private employers, it would be very surprising if “loved one” in a be-
                                                        
255  Cacciatore, Feminist, supra note 71, at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
LAYNE, supra note 3, at 131). 
256  Cacciatore et al., Stillbirth and the Couple: A Gender-Based Exploration, 11 J. FAM. 
SOC. WORK 351, 365 (2008) [hereinafter Cacciatore et al., Stillbirth]. 
257  Cacciatore, Feminist, supra note 71, at 91. 
258  See id. Some differences noted in the research is that mothers’ grief tends to last longer. 
See Cacciatore et al., Stillbirth, supra note 256, at 365. At the same time, men may delay 
their grief, though, as one study showed that men displayed more grief than women twelve 
years after the baby’s death. See Joann O’Leary, The Trauma of Ultrasound During a Preg-
nancy Following Perinatal Loss, 10 J. LOSS & TRAUMA 183, 197 (2005). 
259  Cacciatore et al., Stillbirth, supra note 256, at 353. 
260  Id. at 354 (explaining that “bereaved fathers struggle with their multiple roles feeling 
powerless to support and protect their loved ones”) (quoting Deborah Smith Armstrong, 
Emotional Distress and Prenatal Attachment in Pregnancy After Perinatal Loss, 34 J. 
NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 339, 344 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
261  Id. (quoting John De Frain et al., The Psychological Effects of a Stillbirth on Surviving 
Family Members, 22 OMEGA 81, 97 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
262  Id. at 364. 
263  See Landry v. Clement, 711 So. 2d 829, 836 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (pointing to plaintiff’s 
staying away from work for three months as evidence of her damages); McCann v. ABC Ins. 
Co., 640 So. 2d 865, 875–76 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that plaintiff’s grief did not allow 
her to work for a couple of months). 
264  See Cacciatore et al., Stillbirth, supra note 256, at 354. 
265  SHERYL SANDBERG & ADAM GRANT, OPTION B: FACING ADVERSITY, BUILDING 
RESILIENCE, AND FINDING JOY 20 (2017); see also Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 
132 (describing the potential economic impacts of stillbirth, including that it may cost par-
ents “lower wages over the life course”). Sandberg and Grant further explain the adverse 
economic effects of the lack of bereavement time: “In the United States alone, grief-related 
losses in productivity may cost companies as much as $75 billion annually. These losses 
could be decreased and the load could be lightened for people who are grieving if employers 
provided time off, flexible and reduced hours, and financial assistance.” SANDBERG & 
GRANT, supra note 265, at 20. 
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reavement policy covered an unborn baby. An early return to work for either 
the father or mother does not indicate a lack of injury.266 
Second, a non-birth parent’s injury is foreseeable. If malpractice, the obste-
trician will likely have a relationship with the parent if he or she attended pre-
natal medical appointments.267 “In counseling and providing services to a 
woman relating to her pregnancy, there inherently (biologically necessarily) is 
one and only one other identifiable individual with the potential to be a victim 
. . .—the father.”268 Even if not biological, the parents are identifiable. 
Last, recognizing a claim for the non-birth parents creates only one or two 
more claims, meaning liability will not grow disproportionately,269 nor will the 
amount of litigation. “[T]he mother’s claim would essentially always be present 
and the likelihood of a paternal claim without participation of the mother seems 
vanishingly small . . . .”270 Even in adoption or surrogacy contexts, both non-
birth parents would have, at most, two claims. 
Something else is likely lurking underneath these legal technicalities, 
something specific to fathers—a view of “a world in which children are central 
to their mothers’ emotional lives,”271 but not their fathers’ emotional lives.272 
Some may still even question whether fathers have emotional lives. 
That was the controlling worldview when the California Supreme Court 
decided Dillon v. Legg and enabled recovery of emotional distress damages for 
witnessing injury to another.273 The case involved a mother witnessing injury to 
her daughter, and Justice Tobriner emphasized the nature of the mother-child 
relationship in his opinion.274 In fact, “[m]uch of Tobriner’s opinion is written 
in gender-specific language (mother, rather than parent) . . . .”275 In his own lat-
er explanation of the case, Justice Tobriner explained recovery as the “natural 
justice” of the mother’s claims.276 At the same time, he made the Dillon test 
                                                        
266  But see Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1290 (N.J. 1993) (mentioning the mother’s re-
turn to work as evidence of a lack of damages within decision to reduce damages the jury 
awarded). 
267  See Fox, supra note 223, at 217–18 (arguing for recognition of duty from doctor to non-
patient partner in reproductive context because “partner’s participation in the treatment pro-
cess triggers a duty”). 
268  See Meleney-Distassio v. Weinstein, No. FSTCV136018746S, 2014 WL 7462584, at *8 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2014). 
269  See id. at *12, *17 (dismissing fears of disproportionality and recognizing duty owed to 
both mother/patient and father for “wrongful abortion” claim when parents terminated preg-
nancy after doctor’s mistaken diagnosis of significant genetic fetal abnormality). 
270  Id. at *9. 
271  Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 857. 
272  Seymore, supra note 210, at 830 (“Much of law ascribes to men the desire to avoid fa-
therhood and a basic disinterest in their children.”). 
273  See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968). 
274  Id. at 921. 
275  Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 857. 
276  Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. 
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gender neutral, allowing fathers to recover damages for their emotional dis-
tress.277 
Nine years later, the California Supreme Court applied that gender-neutral 
Dillon test to a father’s claim for emotional distress after stillbirth. In Justus v. 
Atchison, the Court denied a wrongful death claim for stillbirth and also denied 
the father a negligence claim based on Dillon. 278 The father was present for the 
medical malpractice that killed his full-term unborn child, who the Court de-
scribed only as “the fetus.”279 One reason the Court denied recovery was be-
cause the father did not witness the death. Although he was “in attendance at 
the death of the fetus, that event was by its very nature hidden from his con-
temporaneous perception: he could not see the injury to the victim . . . .”280 His 
emotional distress was caused “not from what he saw and heard during the at-
tempted delivery, but from what he was told after the fact”281—presumably a 
difference of mere hours at the most and possibly minutes at the least. The 
Court further denied recovery because the father “was in the delivery room by 
his own choice” and should have been “prepared for the possibility of unpleas-
ant or even harrowing experiences.”282 Justice Tobriner concurred in Justus, but 
only discussed his agreement that a wrongful death claim should not be availa-
ble because “the wrongful death of a fetus” is “a wholly intangible injury to 
plaintiffs for which any monetary recovery can provide no real compensa-
tion.”283 
California courts have backed off this Justus holding to an extent. A lower 
court allowed a father’s claim to proceed because he alleged more than pres-
ence in the delivery room—“[h]ere, however, plaintiff alleges that he learned of 
the death by his own observation of the cessation of life in the fetus and that his 
shock and distress were occasioned by that sensory and contemporaneous reali-
zation of the death.”284 Another lower court avoided Dillon completely by clas-
sifying the father as a direct victim, analogizing his claim to a recognized claim 
by a couple against a doctor for misdiagnosis of syphilis causing the couple 
emotional distress.285 Also, the California Supreme Court has clarified that vol-
untary presence does not necessarily preclude recovery.286 But the claim will 
still be difficult. “Apart from a plaintiff who because of medical training or 
                                                        
277  Id. at 923–25. 
278  Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 136 (Cal. 1977). 
279  Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
280  Id. 
281  Id. at 136. 
282  Id. 
283  Id. (Tobriner, J., concurring). 
284  Austin v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 152 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
285  Sesma v. Cueto, 181 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
286  Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1985) (“While in a proper case it may be 
said that a bystander assumed the risk of traumatic shock, we cannot say that in the ordinary 
course of events the voluntary or involuntary presence of the plaintiff should be a decisive 
factor in determining whether plaintiff has stated a Dillon cause of action.”). 
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other unusual circumstances is capable of diagnosing intrauterine fetal death, a 
plaintiff suffering emotional distress as a consequence of witnessing a stillbirth 
will probably be unable to recover after Justus, although the emotional distress 
is foreseeable.”287 And Justus is from the same Court celebrated for expanding 
recovery for emotional distress in Dillon.288 
With respect to the outdated view of fatherhood, dissenting Justice Gonza-
lez of the Texas Supreme Court said it best: “[B]y holding that the mother but 
not the father may bring such a claim, the Court perpetuates the myth that only 
a woman grieves and suffers the mental anguish caused by the loss of a baby in 
the womb.”289 We know this is a myth; empirical research demonstrates that 
“the trauma of infant loss . . . profoundly affects fathers . . . .”290 Even the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has recognized “the deep and proper concern and in-
terest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in 
the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying.”291 No reason exists to 
deny the father, or any non-birth parent, a claim after the death of their unborn 
children. 
D. The Undervaluing of Damages 
Even when not expressly devaluing stillbirth though, tort law still implicit-
ly undervalues it. Valuation of all intangible injuries is difficult.292 Juries are 
rarely told anything more than to award an amount to compensate the plaintiff 
for her injury.293 In a Hawaii case, a jury awarded the mother $250,000 for her 
emotional distress and $100,000 in consortium damages after stillbirth.294 A 
                                                        
287  Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coher-
ence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 595 (1982). 
288  See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 113, at 855–58. 
289  Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex. 1995) (Gonzalez J., dissenting). One 
Texas appellate court agreed with Justice Gonzalez and recognized the father’s claim. See 
Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). Essentially, if Texas is willing to 
pretend that the death of the baby is a physical injury to the mother, then it should also be a 
physical injury to the father based on his sperm contribution. The court sarcastically refused 
to “assume that the physiology of every living person derives only from the mother and that 
a child’s physiological makeup includes no part of the father.” See id. The same court later 
disagreed, however. Reese v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 203, 206 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2002). The Texas Supreme Court later expressly overruled the Parvin court’s anal-
ysis concluding that Texas’s lack of a wrongful death claim for stillbirth violated equal pro-
tection. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 97 n.1 (Tex. 2004). 
290  O’Leary, supra note 258, at 185; see also Seymore, supra note 210, at 831 (explaining 
how the nature of fatherhood has changed and how it is now “widely suggested that contem-
porary fathers are now expected to have, and to desire, a closer, more emotionally involved 
and nurturing relationship with their children.”). 
291  Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976). 
292  See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries 
Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773, 781–82 (1995) 
(explaining that no objective guideline exists for measuring intangible injuries). 
293  Id. at 781. 
294  Castro v. Melchor, 366 P.3d 1058, 1061 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016). 
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Florida jury awarded parents $2.5 million dollars for their emotional distress 
due to stillbirth.295 A Texas jury awarded a mother $250,000 for her emotional 
distress.296 And an Iowa jury awarded parents $1.71 million in damages for loss 
of consortium after stillbirth.297 
Neither the high awards nor their inconsistency is surprising.298 Damage 
awards are supposed to be specific to the injured plaintiff—to compensate her 
specific emotional distress and/or loss consortium after delivering her dead 
son.299 If specificity is required, each award will and should be different. “The 
range of experiences following the death of a child tend to vary with the age of 
the child, the cause and context of the death and the personalities and experi-
ences of the parents–both having and losing a child can mean different things to 
different people.”300 
One thing that is consistent in damage awards, however—likely undervalu-
ation. Tort law fails to guard against the influence of common cultural devalua-
tions of stillbirth, devaluations that stillbirth is somehow lessened by the re-
placeability of children and the presence of other children. Tort law also 
mandates undervaluation through the currently popular caps on noneconomic 
damages, the effect of which is especially harsh in cases of stillbirth because 
parents have no significant economic damages. 
1. “You Can Have Another” 
Tort law recognizes a doctrine called mitigation of damages, which re-
quires a plaintiff to act reasonably after her injury to mitigate, to lower, her 
damages. “Because emotional distress takes place entirely within the plaintiff’s 
mind, it could be difficult to observe or verify whether he took appropriate ex 
post care.”301 But after stillbirth, the answer to helping relieve emotional dis-
tress seems pretty easy—just have another baby. If parents did not do so, argu-
ably they have failed to mitigate their damages. They are choosing to continue 
                                                        
295  Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
296  Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
297  Heimlicher v. Steele, 615 F. Supp. 2d 884, 937 (N.D. Iowa 2009). The court reduced the 
damage award to $1.55 million after concluding the jury did not use appropriate amounts to 
deduct the costs of raising the child. Id. at 941–42; see also William Glaberson, After Still-
birth, Courts Try to Put a Price on a Mother’s Anguish, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2011), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/nyregion/in-stillbirth-malpractice-cases-courts-try-to-put-pric 
e-on-mothers-anguish.html [https://perma.cc/VP4E-BATM] (discussing the difficulty of de-
termining damages in the first cases brought in New York after the law was finally changed 
to allow recovery after stillbirth). 
298  See Geistfeld, supra note 292, at 784. 
299  See id. at 781. 
300  LITTLEWOOD, supra note 84, at 122; see also Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 
421 (“It is important to remember that grief is a very individual experience.”). 
301  Eugene Kontorovich, The Mitigation of Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
491, 503 (2001). 
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to grieve. Or, maybe the parents never really wanted a baby as evidenced by 
their decision to not try again. 
This mitigation-like sentiment has also appeared in numerous court deci-
sions. The New Jersey Supreme Court mentioned the mother’s subsequent 
pregnancy within its decision to reduce the damages the jury awarded.302 A de-
fendant argued before the Virginia Supreme Court that the mother was not real-
ly injured by her son’s death due to stillbirth because she later gave birth to 
twin girls.303 Similarly, a Florida court mentioned the parents’ inability to have 
another child in affirming the damages the jury awarded.304 
“The replacement-child strategy of coping with grief is seen in stillbirth be-
reavement probably more frequently than in any other case.”305 This is one of 
the comments that cuts the hardest after the death of an unborn baby—“you can 
have another.”306 Apparently, the birth of that later child will somehow magi-
cally lessen the grief from losing a child. 
Many years ago, the medical community also thought the best thing for a 
woman would be to “have another baby in order to help put the loss behind 
her.”307 Even though parents today do not simply re-use the baby’s name for 
the next child,308 an idea persists that a new baby can help fix things. Babies 
                                                        
302  Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1290 (N.J. 1993). 
303  Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 238 (Va. 1986). 
304  Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that the moth-
er’s “inability to conceive [any other children] . . . was germane to the issue of damages for 
the mental pain and anguish caused by the loss of the [parents’] only child.”); see also Syl-
vester v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 431, 432–33 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (Miller, J., dis-
senting) (voting to affirm the damages awarded to parents after the wrongful death of their 
two 12-year-old daughters for numerous reasons, including that the mother “has been unable 
to conceive, and has been treated by two gynecologists, to no avail.”). Social science re-
search has not documented whether grief is worsened because of biology, but no research 
has been this specific. Unlike the other incorrect assumptions about grief—that you can just 
have another, that other children make this easier—however, this assumption will cause the 
jury to increase any damages awarded. Thus, even if inaccurate, it is an inaccuracy that will 
benefit the grieving parents. 
305  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 423. 
306  Sarah Meaney et al., Parents’ Concerns About Future Pregnancy After Stillbirth: A 
Qualitative Study, 20 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 555, 558 (2017) (discussing the unhelpful re-
sponses received by parents of stillborn babies, including being “told that they were young 
and that they would [have] plenty of opportunities to have more children”); see also Kelley 
& Trinidad, supra note 2, at 8 (“For [the] parents in these focus groups, the most common 
and most hurtful comments were reassurances that they would have another baby.”); Kirk-
ley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 425 (explaining that “society expected that a young 
mother would not grieve for a stillbirth,” a thought validated by the immediate response of 
telling the mother to not worry because she could have another child). 
307  Meaney et al., supra note 306, at 555; see also supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text 
(describing the changes in medical practices following stillbirth). 
308  Sanger, supra note 59, at 283. 
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born after a previous miscarriage, stillbirth, or infant death are referred to as 
“rainbow babies”—the new baby is a rainbow after the storm.309 
Empirical research of parents after stillbirth, however, demonstrates that 
replaceability is false. Parents who have lost a baby do not want any baby—
they want the baby they lost. Parents find the replaceability sentiment “dis-
missive” and that it “fail[s] to recognize or respect” the parents’ loss.310 The 
sentiment also fails to appreciate that the parents “lost a particular, loved baby, 
and that for a parent, there is no substitute for a dead child.”311 “Grief for the 
deceased baby does not go away just because there is a new pregnancy” or a 
new baby.312 
The replacement child strategy also severely underestimates the trauma 
that can accompany a subsequent pregnancy. “Unquestionably, fear plays a role 
in the decision for another baby.”313 If we could see within that decision, we 
would likely see parents wondering what if the next baby also dies.  
[I]t is impossible to repeat the experience of prenatal care, labor, and the birthing 
process without stimulating painful past memories. Rather than being a time of 
joy, expectation, and a new beginning, the subsequent pregnancy can become a 
reactivation of the previous event, causing fear and anxiety that death can hap-
pen again.314 
                                                        
309  Melissa Willets, What It Means to Be a ‘Rainbow Baby’ and Why Rainbow Babies Are 
Beautiful, PARENTS, https://www.parents.com/baby/what-it-means-to-be-a-rainbow-baby-an 
d-why-rainbow-babies-are-beautiful/ [https://perma.cc/FM7P-5EWM] (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019). 
310  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 8. 
311  Id.; see also Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 424 (“[P]arents of stillbirths 
mourn for the particular baby they lose, not just for the wish of a child.”). 
312  Côté-Arsenault & O’Leary, supra note 254, at 164 (discussing research showing that 
“[w]omen with a prior pregnancy loss have been found to have higher levels of depression 
during pregnancy and for up to 33 months after the birth of a healthy child.”); see also Posi-
tion Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 6 (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PLIDA_PositionStatement_PrenancyAfte 
rPerinatalLossRequiresUniqueCare.pdf [https://perma.cc/28LY-NZQM] (discussing that 
parents “also struggle with attaching after birth and trusting this baby will stay alive.”). But 
see Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 131 (“[T]he most important factor that influ-
enced depressive symptoms in this study was not having a live-born baby in the three years 
following the loss. This risk increased if the baby was the third child and rose again when the 
stillborn baby was the fourth or fifth born in the family.”). 
313  Cacciatore, Unique, supra note 153, at 143; see also Fox, supra note 223, at 193 (dis-
cussing the invasion of privacy that would occur if plaintiffs were forced to consider abor-
tion or adoption to mitigate damages after wrongful pregnancy/imposed procreation). 
314  O’Leary, supra note 258, at 185; see also Position Statement, PREGNANCY LOSS & 
INFANT DEATH ALLIANCE 3 (Aug. 2016), http://www.plida.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ 
PLIDA_PositionStatement_PrenancyAfterPerinatalLossRequiresUniqueCare.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/28LY-NZQM] (“The response to losing a wished-for child is related to the degree of 
personhood assigned to the unborn and the level of expectation one has for pregnancy. Fear 
and anxiety are not limited to women who have experienced a loss late in pregnancy but, 
rather, have been found in women who experience early miscarriage . . .”). Despite extensive 
research documenting the risks of “anxiety, depression, and attachment issues to the baby 
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Simple doctor visits to hear a heartbeat turn into anxiety attacks.315 An ul-
trasound is supposed to be reassuring, but for many of these parents, the last 
time they had an ultrasound, it revealed that their baby had died. “Each ultra-
sound brings back the fear of seeing another dead baby,”316 and can “elicit 
traumatic memories, resulting in behaviors similar to what has been found in 
people who experience PTSD.”317 
Research shows that “women pregnant after the loss of a stillborn child 
were more vulnerable to case-level symptoms of PTSD, suffering the dual psy-
chological burden of trauma and bereavement.”318 Research shows the same for 
fathers.319 In one study, fathers reported: 
They were ‘exhausted emotionally’ and frequently inquired if their pregnant 
partners were still feeling movements. Their perceived “. . . role of protector was 
intensified although they were aware that they had no control of the outcome” 
and while they had to stay strong on the outside, inside they felt stressed and 
vulnerable.320 
The chances of depression in the subsequent pregnancy increase the shorter 
the time it follows stillbirth.321 In fact, a small study in the late 1970s showed 
“the only predictor of morbid grief reactions was the presence of a surviving 
twin or subsequent pregnancy within five months of the loss.”322 
                                                                                                                                
that follows, prenatal care for these families has not significantly changed.” Id. at 2. Caccia-
tore, Unique, supra note 153, at 143 (“As in any circumstance involving trauma, when the 
traumatized person returns to the place or state in which the original trauma occurred, there 
is likely to be some degree of physical, emotional, and psychological distress . . . .”). 
315  Côté-Arsenault & O’Leary, supra note 254, at 164 (“High anxiety is common leading up 
to prenatal appointments, due to the fear that something bad will be found . . . .”). 
316  O’Leary, supra note 258, at 192; id. at 187–88 (“[V]alidation of a baby’s death through 
visual technology suggests that an ultrasound examination in a subsequent pregnancy would 
be a uniquely different experience.”). 
317  Id. at 184. 
318  Id. at 185. 
319  Murphy & Cacciatore, supra note 69, at 131. 
320  Id. (quoting Joann O’Leary & Clare Thorwick, Fathers ’ Perspectives During Pregnan-
cy, Postperinatal Loss, 35 J. OBSTETRIC, GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 78, 81 
(2006)); see also O’Leary, supra note 258, at 185 (explaining that “fathers in a subsequent 
pregnancy have reported keeping feelings of worry and stress level from their partner in or-
der to stay strong for the rest of the family.”); id. at 186 (explaining that “the trauma of in-
fant loss and the subsequent pregnancy profoundly affects fathers.”). 
321  See Alessandra Biaggi et al., Identifying the Women at Risk of Antenatal Anxiety and De-
pression: A Systematic Review, 191 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 62, 69 (2016). Many studies 
have shown potential long-term negative consequences for rainbow babies. Research also 
shows possible issues after a successful birth. Research shows that the mother may compare 
the replacement child to the lost child, leaving the replacement child to “live[] in the shadow 
of the dead child, often incapacitated by death phobias and fears of abandonment.” Kirkley-
Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 423. The mother may also unintentionally treat the re-
placement child as “responsible for their sibling’s death,” forcing the child to “live in a hos-
tile-dependent environment with [his] parents.” Id. Ultimately, a subsequent pregnancy to 
replace a baby is not a good idea; “becoming pregnant to resolve a loss appears to be a pseu-
do-resolution, detrimental to all parties involved.” Id. 
322  Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 424. 
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Tort law specifically guards against the replaceability sentiment for loss of 
spousal consortium damages. If a spouse dies, the jury is not allowed to reduce 
the amount of loss of consortium damages because of potential remarriage.323 
In fact, courts exclude evidence of the surviving spouse’s remarriage or pro-
spective remarriage,324 meaning the jury will never even hear about it. The 
spouse’s consortium damages “are fixed at the time of death.”325 The loss of the 
spousal relationship will always exist, and the surviving spouse will be com-
pensated for it. 
A few courts also apply this sentiment when children die, including two 
Louisiana lower courts. The first was in a case involving the death of a living 
child: “While it is true that the [parents] subsequently had two daughters, the 
[parents] testified that the girls could not take the place of their lost son.”326 
Another Louisiana court said the same after stillbirth: 
We do not feel that subsequent pregnancies and births should be considered as 
mitigating factors, unless offered to directly rebut prior testimony. The [parents] 
did not testify at trial that they were unable to conceive and have more children, 
and it would be highly prejudicial and unfair to the [parents] to focus the jury’s 
attention on the subsequent pregnancies instead of on the loss at hand.327 
This Louisiana court is correct—subsequent pregnancies do not magically 
lessen the injury that is death due to stillbirth. Loss of filial consortium damag-
es, just like loss of spousal consortium damages, are fixed at the time of 
death.328 
2. “You’re Lucky to Have Your Other Children” 
Related to replaceability is an idea that stillbirth is less devastating if par-
ents have other living children. The Utah Supreme Court expressed this senti-
ment when it recognized a wrongful death claim after stillbirth.329 When dis-
                                                        
323  DOBBS, supra note 197, at 675 (“Remarriage of a surviving spouse after the death is usu-
ally ignored in fixing damages; the remarried spouse recovers as if support and consortium 
would be lost for the rest of the plaintiff’s life.”). 
324  See, e.g., Randles v. Ind. Patient’s Comp. Fund, 860 N.E.2d 1212, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007) (“Indiana has long held that evidence of remarriage is not admissible to mitigate dam-
ages in a wrongful death action.”); Stuart v. Consol. Foods Corp., 496 P.2d 527, 529–30 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (discussing that evidence of remarriage is inadmissible in wrongful 
death claim). 
325  DOBBS, supra note 197, at 675. 
326  McCann v. ABC Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 865, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1994); see also Nelson v. 
Holley, 623 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting mother’s argument that trial 
court’s admission of testimony regarding other living children encouraged jury to think that 
other children mitigated mother’s loss of child). 
327  Landry v. Clement, 711 So. 2d 829, 836 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
328  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So. 3d 307, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (Wetherell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding damage awards from 
child wrongful deaths unanalogous because the death of a child “is a far more traumatic loss 
than the loss of a spouse to lung cancer after a lifetime of smoking”). 
329  See Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1975). 
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cussing whether it was proper for the jury to hear that the stillborn child was 
“illegitimate,” the Court explained: 
The appellant had seven other children, and her mental anguish might not be so 
acute at the loss of an illegitimate fetus as would be if she had no children and 
the one expected was legitimate. Many women undergo abortions in such a situ-
ation, and the jury was entitled to know all the circumstances if they were to 
fairly appraise the quantum of mental anguish which appellant suffered.330 
Although the case did not involve stillbirth, this sentiment was also visible 
in Robinson v. Cutchin.331 The mother sued her doctor for battery after a proce-
dure left her unable to have additional biological children.332 The court denied 
recovery partially because “the fact that she was not able to have a seventh 
child after previously giving birth to six children is hardly something which 
would offend her reasonable sense of personal dignity.”333 
Although it is undoubtedly true that, after losing a child, parents “con-
sciously appreciate[] the miracle of a healthy child,”334 empirical research of 
parents after stillbirth demonstrates that the existence of other living children 
does not magically lessen grief. Research of surviving siblings shows that some 
parents are so overwhelmed with grief after stillbirth that they, unfortunately, 
check out on their other living children.335 The research notes that surviving 
siblings suffer two losses—the loss of their baby brother, and the loss of their 
former relationship with their parents.336 This change in the parents, despite 
other living children, shows that parents are not able to just move on based on 
the joy of their other children. 
Research of parents of multiples where one baby does not survive shows 
the same: 
Most mothers were keen to stress that the joy of giving birth to a surviving baby 
from a twin pregnancy did not detract from their grief for the baby who died. 
They pointed to (well meaning) platitudes made by some health professionals 
who suggested that although they had suffered a bereavement, there was comfort 
to be had in having another baby who had survived. All of the mothers inter-
viewed felt strongly that one baby cannot ‘replace’ another.337 
                                                        
330  Id. 
331  Robinson v. Cutchin, 140 F. Supp. 2d 488 (D. Md. 2001). 
332  Id. at 490. 
333  Id. at 493 (emphasis added). Professors Chamallas and Wriggins thoroughly criticize the 
Robinson opinion and its “disconcerting tendency to devalue plaintiff’s procreative interests 
and to minimize her suffering.” CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 110. They also 
argue that the devaluation is especially problematic because of the historical denial of self-
determination for African American women with respect to childbearing. Id. 
334  Joann O’Leary & Jane Warland, Intentional Parenting of Children Born After a Perina-
tal Loss, 17 J. LOSS & TRAUMA 137, 145 (2012). 
335  See Côté-Arsenault & O’Leary, supra note 254, at 164–65. 
336  See id. 
337  Judy Richards et al., Mothers’ Perspectives on the Perinatal Loss of a Co-Twin: A Quali-
tative Study, BIOMED CENT. PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH, July 2, 2015, at 4. 
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Understandably, parents reported “intense but mixed feelings of grief, joy, 
anxiety and depression.”338 The parents also reported feeling pressure to be 
“ok” after the loss—to be “strong” for the surviving child.339 
Moreover, parenting after stillbirth is just different.340 Parenting styles can 
change; parents “[knew] the worst possible outcome because it had happened to 
them.”341 Parents experience “contradictory feelings of simultaneous joy and 
grief.”342 The joyous moments—hearing your children laugh, seeing them play-
ing together—seemingly would lessen parents’ grief. But the happy moments 
are also sad. The stillborn baby should also be there laughing and playing. 
Empirical research shows that the presence of other living children does 
not magically lessen the damages parents suffer after stillbirth. Tort law must 
guard against any possibility that a jury would consciously or unconsciously 
devalue stillbirth because the parents have other living children. 
3. Noneconomic Damage Caps 
It may not matter if the jury undervalues the parents’ loss, however, be-
cause some state legislatures have already mandated undervaluation. That is 
because of noneconomic damage caps. The purported distinction between eco-
nomic and noneconomic damages is that economic damages, like lost wages, 
are measurable because of the relevant market, but no objective monetary 
measure exists for emotional distress or relational injuries.343 At this point, the 
majority of states cap the recovery of noneconomic damages in some way,344 
and more may do so in the future.345 
                                                        
338  Id. at 10. 
339  Id. 
340  See DEFRAIN ET AL., supra note 80, at 157 (“It was the very rare parent who saw no ef-
fect at all on his or her childrearing attitudes and behavior.”); O’Leary & Warland, supra 
note 335, at 147. 
341  O’Leary & Warland, supra note 334, at 147. 
342  Richards et al., supra note 337, at 4. 
343  See Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffer-
ing Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 383 (2006) (explaining that “[n]oneconomic 
damages might be best understood in contrast with economic damages, which are those ex-
penses that can be traced to a loss with a market value. Medical expenses, lost wages, and 
lost profits are economic losses. Noneconomic losses, on the other hand, refer to those losses 
that have no easily calculable market value. This category includes such diverse damages as 
compensation for physical pain, mental suffering, disfigurement as a harm in itself, loss of 
bodily function, loss of enjoyment of life, and embarrassment.”); see also Chamallas, Archi-
tecture, supra note 9, at 503–04. The claim by proponents of the caps is that the caps are 
warranted because the “real” losses, i.e., the economic damages, are still available, the im-
plication being that noneconomic loss is somehow less essential to a fair system of compen-
sation. Id. 
344  See, e.g., Elliot M. Kroll & James M. Westerlind, Arent Fox LLP Survey of Damage 
Laws of the 50 States Including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, ARENT FOX, LLP 
(2012), https://www.arentfox.com/sites/default/files/Downloads/bio/2012201220122012Aug 
19 NEV. L.J. 955, LENS 5/28/2019  10:29 AM 
1000 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
 
Many scholars have already noted that the effect of these caps is harshest 
in cases where the plaintiff suffers mainly noneconomic damages, like victims 
of sexual assault.346 Stillbirth is another one of those cases. Parents will have 
some economic damages, mainly funeral expenses. But the vast majority of 
parents’ damages are noneconomic—general mental anguish and loss of con-
sortium. And recovery of those intangible, noneconomic damages will be 
capped. 
Noneconomic damage caps mean parents will not be fully compensated for 
the negligently caused deaths of their children.347 True, those parents would be 
the first to tell you that no amount of money can truly compensate; money does 
not bring their babies back. In fact, the inability of money to truly compensate 
for noneconomic harm is a common justification for damage caps.348 But pre-
tending that an arbitrary, pre-set amount of noneconomic damages—$250,000 
or $400,000349—comes even close to compensating parents is insulting. 
The vast majority of states that cap the recovery of noneconomic damages 
do so only in medical malpractice claims.350 The purpose of medical malprac-
tice damage caps is to protect doctors from high awards, although doctors re-
                                                                                                                                
AugWedWed/AF-Survey-of-Damage-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX2D-5M6M] (explaining 
that nineteen states cap the recovery of noneconomic damages, and that fifteen of those 
states caps apply only to medical malpractice claims). 
345  See, e.g., Arkansas Lawmakers Put Cap on Lawsuit Damages On ‘18 Ballot, U.S. NEWS, 
(Mar. 1, 2017, 4:53 P.M.), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/mar/01/arkansas-law 
makers-put-cap-lawsuit-damages-18-ball/ [https://perma.cc/UVU3-VVDU]. 
346  See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and 
the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1278 (2004) [hereinafter Finley, Hidden Victims]; Lucinda 
M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 
847, 851 (1997) [hereinafter Finley, Female Trouble]. 
347  Many scholars have already documented that caps of noneconomic damages dispropor-
tionately affect female plaintiffs. See generally Finley, Hidden Victims supra note 346; Fin-
ley, Female Trouble, supra note 346; Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort 
Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
348  See Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 490, 497–98. 
349  Many states have different rules for wrongful death versus negligence claims, and allow-
ing plaintiffs greater recovery, if death is involved. For example, some states have no cap at 
all for wrongful death claims. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2018); LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2018) (capping recovery for malpractice claims, but not capping recovery 
in wrongful death claims). Or, some states set the cap at a higher amount, enabling greater 
recovery, for wrongful death. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2018) (setting cap on 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claim at $400,000 for cases involving “per-
sonal injury” and at $700,000 in cases involving death); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 74.301, 74.303 (West 2017) (setting different monetary caps for medical malpractice 
claims involving injuries versus wrongful death). Presumably, this is because legislatures 
think more noneconomic damages should be recoverable after death than after nonfatal inju-
ry. If the state recognizes a wrongful death claim after stillbirth, parents may get full recov-
ery if no cap exists, or a more general recovery if a more generous wrongful death damage 
cap exists. Thus, parents will either be fully compensated or a little bit less undercompen-
sated if a wrongful death claim exists. 
350  See generally Kroll & Westerlind, supra note 344 (explaining that the vast majority of 
noneconomic damage caps apply only to medical malpractice claims). 
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main liable for potentially large economic damages awards, which can easily be 
extensive in a typical medical malpractice claim involving physical injury to a 
younger person who could have extensive damages based on years of future 
lost wages and future medical expenses. 
Consider the effect of a medical malpractice cap on noneconomic damages 
applied to stillbirth. Some parents can recover for their full damages after a 
stillbirth, and some will receive much less—depending on who negligently 
caused the stillbirth. If the stillbirth is caused by a defendant texting while driv-
ing, the parents will be able to receive their full damages. That unreasonable 
driver does not know that the woman is pregnant, but he must pay all of the 
parents’ damages. 
But if a doctor causes the stillbirth, the mother’s recovery of noneconomic 
damages will be capped. The doctor is the one person the parents trusted the 
most to help bring the baby into the world. Most commonly, the mother’s rela-
tionship with her obstetrician would have started at least at the beginning of the 
pregnancy, or even earlier in cases of infertility. The woman-obstetrician rela-
tionship is different than a normal doctor-patient relationship: 
Because of the intimate nature of obstetrician and gynecology care and the criti-
cal role these physicians play in some of the most memorable times in women’s 
lives, particularly in caring for them during pregnancy and childbirth, patients 
are more likely to develop closer and more personal relationships with their ob-
stetricians and gynecologists.351 
The baby is dead, and the one person the parents trusted the most tortiously 
caused it. 
Parents really only have noneconomic damages. And if caps exist, parents 
will be undercompensated. As examples, in Texas, the mother can recover 
$250,000 if her doctor’s negligent conduct killed her unborn baby.352 In Mis-
souri, parents can recover only $700,000 if a doctor negligently kills their un-
born baby.353 And in California, the mother can also only recover $250,000 for 
her unborn child’s unnecessary death.354 In all three states, had the parents also 
had some lost wages, those economic damages would be fully recoverable. 
Damage caps are not specific to cases of stillbirth, but their effects are harsh in 
cases where the significant damages are noneconomic. Stillbirths are one of 
those cases, and damage caps further devalue parents’ injury after stillbirth. 
                                                        
351  Isha Patel et al., Patient Satisfaction with Obstetricians and Gynecologists Compared 
with Other Specialties: Analysis of US Self-Reported Survey Data, 2 PATIENT RELATED 
OUTCOME MEASURES 21, 25 (2011). 
352  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (West 2017). 
353  MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2018). 
354  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2018). 
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III. TORT LAW PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES SUPPORT A WRONGFUL DEATH 
CLAIM FOR STILLBIRTH 
A wrongful death claim should be available for stillbirth.355 This is the type 
of claim that is available for an infant who lives a few minutes after birth;356 it 
should also be available for stillbirth. Both mental anguish and loss of consorti-
um damages should be available because parents experience both mental an-
guish and a loss of the parent-child relationship. A wrongful death claim also 
cleanly recognizes both parents’ ability to recover damages for the wrongful 
death of a child, helping minimize the current gendered nature of stillbirth. 
As part of recognizing a wrongful death claim, tort law must also be care-
ful to avoid implicit or unintentional devaluation of stillbirth. Language mat-
ters; “unless the full effect of injuries are articulated and explained, they can 
more easily be minimized.”357 Parents did not just lose a fetus, they lost their 
desired, unborn child with whom they had already bonded, and courts should 
describe that loss appropriately. Courts must also clarify that even unborn chil-
dren are not replaceable and that other children do not lessen injury after still-
birth. 
Tort law purposes and theories support these suggested reforms. The main 
purpose of tort law is to compensate injured victims.358 Consistent with this 
compensation purpose is corrective justice theory, under which “tort law is un-
derstood as aiming to restore an equilibrium that has been disturbed by the tort-
feasor’s conduct.”359 It restores that equilibrium “by ordering that the full value 
of the loss be transferred to the responsible party via a damage payment equal 
to the value of the loss,”360 or at least a payment as close to the value of the loss 
as possible.361 
The parents’ loss is the child’s death, a loss that causes parents both mental 
anguish and a lost relationship, two different types of damages. It is impossible 
                                                        
355  Admittedly, problems exist with wrongful death claims for the deaths of minor children. 
Damages for wrongful death are generally based on expected economic contributions, and 
children no longer make significant economic contributions to their family, leaving only 
“noneconomic” damages recoverable for the parents. See STUART M. SPEISER, 1 RECOVERY 
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 112 (2d ed. 1975). Despite the problems with the valuation of dam-
ages after the death of a child, a wrongful death claim is still appropriate because it recog-
nizes that stillbirth involves the death of the parents’ child. 
356  See Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (adopting a wrongful 
death claim for stillbirth because of existence of a such a claim or a baby who dies after 
birth, recognizing the inability to “reconcile the two propositions, that if the death occurred 
after birth there is a cause of action, but that if it occurred before birth there is none.”). 
357  CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 175. 
358  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
359  John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570 (2003). 
360  Id. 
361  Christopher J. Robinette, Party Autonomy in Tort Theory and Reform, 6 J. TORT L. 173, 
176 (2013) (explaining that corrective justice theory focuses on “erasing the harm to the 
greatest extent possible”). 
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to award damages as close to the value of the loss as possible unless both types 
of damages are available. Also, it is impossible to obtain equilibrium-restoring 
damages if the parents’ injury is viewed as the loss of a “fetus,” instead of as 
their unborn child. That a fetus and an unborn baby are viewed differently is 
clear from the abortion debate,362 and the difference matters when juries are de-
termining how much to award. 
The second main purpose of tort law is to deter wrongdoers.363 The more 
that tort law devalues stillbirth, the weaker the message sent to doctors and oth-
ers to avoid causing stillbirth. Consider the message sent when tort law treats 
stillbirth as a mere physical manifestation of emotional distress, like a rash. Or 
the message sent by labelling stillbirth as the death of a “fetus” and denying the 
unborn-child parent relationship lost. A similarly weak message is sent by 
denying the father a claim, denying his injury after his child dies. None of these 
messages communicate the devastation parents will suffer due to stillbirth, 
meaning potential tortfeasors are not properly incentivized to avoid causing 
stillbirth. 
Correct recognition is especially important for obstetricians, who routinely 
see miscarriages and stillbirths. A devastating experience for parents may just 
be a Friday in the office for an obstetrician; this is not to say that obstetricians 
are insensitive, although some can be, but obstetricians are desensitized to 
pregnancy loss because they see it more often. That desensitization may explain 
why “physicians in [a 2012] study conceptualized stillbirth as more like a mis-
carriage than like the death of an infant, whereas parents see it the other way 
around.”364 Tort law must ensure that tortfeasors’ conceptions of injuries match 
the injureds’ conceptions. It is impossible to properly incentivize doctors to 
provide proper medical care if tort law treats the death of a child as something 
less than the death of a child. 
Proper recognition of stillbirth is also supported by another interpretative 
theory of tort law—civil recourse theory, which explains that “a person ought 
to be permitted civil recourse against one who has violated her legal rights.”365 
Tort law thus “empowers victims of these wrongs to demand of the wrongdoer 
responsive action as redress for the wrong.”366 Applying civil recourse theory 
to stillbirth is a bit difficult because civil recourse theory sought to describe tort 
law as it is and the status quo is limited recognition of the injury that is still-
birth.367 However, states that recognize a wrongful death claim do purport to 
                                                        
362  Sanger, supra note 59, at 305 (“Part of the strategy to make abortion hard to get and hard 
to choose has been to define fetuses and embryos as infants, children, persons, and victims 
throughout the law.”). 
363  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW. INST. 1979). 
364  Kelley & Trinidad, supra note 2, at 13. 
365  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 82 (1998). 
366  John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 341, 343 (2011). 
367  Professor Chamallas specifically criticized civil recourse theory because it 
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treat stillbirth like the death of a child. To truly empower parents, however, 
those cases should be about the death of a family member, not a fetus, and there 
should be no doubt that prenatal attachment is real, for both a mother and fa-
ther. 
Underlying tort theory requires proper recognition of stillbirth, but I also 
understand that states are generally hesitant to expand liability for injuries like 
stillbirth that cause only “emotional” damages. I thus understand why states 
may want to limit the ability to bring a claim.368 The current line most states 
draw is at viability,369 allowing a claim only if the unborn baby was old enough 
to likely survive on his own outside of the mother’s womb.370 There is no clear 
gestational age of viability, and it will necessarily change as medicine advanc-
es. 
Conditioning the claim on viability, however, means the claim’s availabil-
ity still rests on the arbitrary cutoff at that first breath outside of the womb. 
Even though still in the womb, if the baby could have survived and taken that 
first breath, he was a family member and the wrongful death claim exists. But if 
not, the parents’ loss is of something less than their child. The viability condi-
tion thus focuses on the unborn baby as an individual. The wrongful death 
claim, however, is focused on the parents’ anguish and lost parent-child rela-
                                                                                                                                
largely just accepts that in the tort hierarchy of types of harm, physical harm is privileged over 
emotional and relational harm. . . . Relational harms, such as loss of consortium for the injury or 
death of intimate family members, are treated as marginal, collateral claims, as mere appendages 
to claims for physical or emotional harms. 
Martha Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 534–35 
(2013). 
368  Although I do question this practically. Around 6,000 unborn babies unnecessarily dying 
each year is far too many, but 6,000 lawsuits really are not that many more. 
369  For the list of the states that recognize a wrongful death claim, see supra note 97. The 
vast majority of these states condition recovery on viability, making it easier to here cite the 
states that do not. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (2019) (Arkansas); 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 180/2.2 (2018) (Illinois); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-7-13 (2018) (Mississippi) (condi-
tioned on “quick[ening],” meaning after the mother has felt the baby move); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 30-809(1) (2018) (Nebraska); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (2018) (Oklahoma); Mack 
v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) 
(conditioned on quickening); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995); Wiersma 
v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 788 (S.D. 1996); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 
(Utah 1975); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wisc. 1967). Assumedly, many states opted to use 
viability as a cutoff because Roe noted that the State’s interest in protecting potential life is 
strongest at the point of viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Stinnett v. 
Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202, 220 (Ala. 2016) (Parker, J., concurring) (“Essentially, Alabama 
previously applied the viability standard established in Roe v. Wade[] to determine which 
unborn children received protection under the law and which did not.”) (citations omitted). 
Thus, states rely on a concept from the abortion context despite abortion and stillbirth having 
little, if anything, in common. See generally infra Part IV (discussing the lack of tension be-
tween abortion rights and recognition of stillbirth). 
370  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) 
but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”). 
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tionship, which do not depend on the baby’s ability to take a breath outside the 
womb. 
If a line must be drawn, cutoff at twenty weeks of pregnancy would be 
proper, necessarily enabling recovery for all stillbirths, but not miscarriages. 
The reason for the twenty-week cutoff is based on the reasonableness of the 
unborn child-parent bond.371 Before twenty weeks, that bond is inherently frag-
ile. Many pregnancies are lost naturally before twenty weeks, meaning parents 
already should be wary of whether the pregnancy will end with the birth of a 
(living) child.372 Before twenty weeks, parents’ hopes are less justified. But af-
ter twenty weeks, the risk of pregnancy loss dramatically decreases and par-
ents’ belief that their child will be born alive is reasonable.373 Tort law should 
award compensation to parents who justifiably have developed a parent-child 
relationship and lose that relationship due to tortiously caused stillbirth. 
Basing the line on the fragility of the parent-child relationship instead of 
viability is also more consistent with research on prenatal attachment. Some re-
search does show that “prenatal attachment scores increase with the weeks of 
gestation.”374 This makes sense as the longer the child and parent are able to 
bond, the greater the bond will be. Research specific to grief after stillbirth sim-
ilarly showed that “more intense grieving responses are associated with later 
losses in pregnancy.”375 Notably, a twenty-week cutoff also matches most 
states’ requirement of a death certificate for the unborn baby after twenty 
weeks of pregnancy.376 
That said, viability will still be relevant, not as a cutoff point, but for causa-
tion. In the January 2018 study on stillbirths, the authors discussed their method 
                                                        
371  The reasonableness and extent of the parent-child relationship relates well to how a 
wrongful death claim is the parents’ claim for their loss, as opposed to a claim that gives the 
unborn child some legal or inherent rights. See infra notes 413–18 (discussing the lack of 
tension between recognition of stillbirth and abortion rights because the wrongful death 
claim is the parents’ claim). Notably, the reasonableness and extent of the parent-child rela-
tionship is a concept that has no application to abortion, the legality of which usually de-
pends on viability. 
372  See Miscarriage, supra note 52 (discussing women’s familiarity with miscarriage be-
cause of its rate being possibly as high as 25 percent). 
373  See id. (describing miscarriage, pregnancy loss before twenty weeks of pregnancy, as 
“the most common type of pregnancy loss”). 
374  Anna Maria Della Vedova et al., Assessing Prenatal Attachment in a Sample of Italian 
Women, 26 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 86, 89, 95 (2008) (discussing research that found 
that “women who had previously experienced a perinatal loss,” and thus are keenly aware of 
the risk of naturally losing the pregnancy, “were significantly less attached to the foetus”). 
375  Id.; but see Kirkley-Best & Kellner, supra note 69, at 425 (discussing a 1980 study that 
“compared grief reactions to types of loss (miscarriage, stillbirth, and neonatal death) and 
concluded no quantifiable differences existed.”); id. (cautioning results of studies of grief 
with the caveat that “great individual differences and a variety of other factors . . . may ac-
count for both quantity and quality of response to loss in pregnancy.”). 
376  See State Definitions and Reporting Requirements for Live Births, Fetal Deaths, and In-
duced Terminations of Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 3–4 (1997), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/itop97.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K8R-89GC]. 
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of determining the definition of a “preventable” stillbirth.377 They defined still-
births before 24 weeks of pregnancy and fetuses under a certain weight as not 
preventable because “[s]uch fetuses would be considered previable or periv-
iable and might not be candidates for operative delivery and resuscitation in 
many centers.”378 Suppose a doctor allegedly committed malpractice by not de-
livering a twenty-week baby despite seeing a partial placental abruption likely 
to lead to the placenta completely detaching from the uterus. Assuming this is 
malpractice, it is not the cause, in tort terms, of the unborn baby’s death be-
cause that baby likely would not have survived had the doctor delivered him. 
This will be true in any case where the only way to save the baby would be to 
deliver him. In tort terms, the deaths of some non-viable unborn babies are in-
evitable and thus the tortfeasors could not be held liable for those deaths. Thus, 
viability will still be relevant for causation, but not as a cutoff. 
I would not, however, advocate compromise on the actual valuation of par-
ents’ damages. Numerous states believe noneconomic damage caps are neces-
sary to protect doctors and/or businesses. But those states are also happy to sub-
ject those same doctors and businesses to very high economic damage awards. 
In cases involving stillbirth, parents suffer no significant economic damages, so 
almost the parents’ entire damage awards will be noneconomic and capped. 
Arbitrarily limited damage awards neither compensate nor deter as tort theories 
require. No magic solution exists for juries to use to value damages to compen-
sate stillbirth. The awards will likely be high, but appropriately so. 
IV. NO THREAT TO LEGALITY OF ABORTION 
It is impossible to address tort law’s recognition of stillbirth without also 
commenting on the elephant in the room—abortion.379 In both the public health 
and legal contexts, stillbirth is often associated with abortion.380 Some believe 
that the association is why stillbirth is often overlooked in the public health 
context.381 
Abortion is a voluntary termination of pregnancy. And a woman has a con-
stitutional right to abortion, a right the Supreme Court first recognized in Roe v. 
                                                        
377  Page et al., supra note 6, at 337. 
378  Id. 
379  See Joanne Cacciatore et al., Condemning Self, Condemning Other: Blame and Mental 
Health in Women Suffering Stillbirth, 35 J. MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING 342, 343 (2013) 
(“Concerned researchers and clinicians have asserted that the stillbirth is systematically 
avoided as a public health issue by . . . reproductive rights foes and activists . . . .”). 
380  See, e.g., Smith v. Borello, 804 A.2d 1151, 1162–63 (Md. 2002) (citing the constitutional 
right to abortion within discussion of whether the baby’s death is like a loss of the mother’s 
“body part[s]”); see also Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Ark. 2001) 
(citing Roe v. Wade when discussing whether an unborn baby is a “person” enabling a 
wrongful death claim); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098 n.5 (Pa. 1985) (same); Pres-
ley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I. 1976) (same). 
381  See Cacciatore et al., supra note 379. 
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Wade,382 although the Court later limited that right in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.383 Despite (or maybe due to) the constitutionality, abortion remains con-
troversial. And some states remain eager to restrict or regulate abortion. Cur-
rent popular laws include banning abortions after a certain gestational age,384 
restricting the use of government funds to pay for abortions,385 restricting pri-
vate insurance coverage of abortion expenses,386 requiring doctors providing 
abortions to have privileges at hospitals,387 requiring abortion clinics to be am-
bulatory centers,388 a mandatory waiting period,389 a mandatory ultrasound,390 
and mandatory burial of fetal remains.391 
Fears of additional regulation on abortion gives some reason to pause be-
fore recognizing tort recovery for stillbirth.392 “[I]f one were to acknowledge 
there was something of value lost,” if we were to validate parents’ grief after 
stillbirth, “one would thereby automatically accede the inherent personhood of 
embryos/fetuses.”393 Similarly, any “legal marker equating fetal life with that of 
born persons” could be made part of efforts to restrict abortion rights.394 “Be-
                                                        
382  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973). 
383  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (allowing states to regulate abor-
tion so long as the regulation does not pose an undue burden on the woman’s ability to ob-
tain an abortion); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s 
Private Choice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1189, 1195–96 (2017) (warning that Roe v. Wade may easi-
ly be overruled in the near future). 
384  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9B-2 (2019). 
385  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-03 (2017). 
386  Id. 
387  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West 2017), invalidated by Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2016). 
388  Id. § 245.010, invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th 
Cir. 2016). 
389  FLA. STAT. § 390.0111 (2019). 
390  Id. 
391  LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.25 (2018). 
392  Applying wrongful death claims to stillbirth has actually been one focus within the pro-
life strategy to limit abortion rights. Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal 
Protection in Wisconsin’s Revised Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 332, 335 (1999) (“[O]ne facet of the long-term, end-game strategy of pro-
life forces has included an attempt to have fetuses declared ‘children’ or ‘persons’ in as 
many legal contexts as possible, including . . . civil wrongful death actions . . .”); see also 
Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in 
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 977–79 
(1995) (suggesting that fighting for reversal of Roe v. Wade is likely to be unsuccessful and 
that the abortion opponents should instead focus on “wrongful death law” to “place[] proper 
value on an unborn child” and that “[t]he emotional power of parents pleading for legal 
recognition of their unborn children may sway societal views and incite political action.”). 
393  Layne, supra note 231, at 305. 
394  Sanger, supra note 59, at 305. For legal scholarship describing the perceived conflict be-
tween tort compensation for the tortious loss of an unborn baby and abortion, see Hutton 
Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986); Rita M. Dunaway, The Personhood Strategy: A State’s Preroga-
tive to Take Back Abortion Law, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327, 327 (2011); Megan Fitzpat-
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cause the issues framing the meaning of miscarriage and stillbirth resonate so 
strongly with the abortion debate, most feminists have maintained a studied si-
lence on the topic.”395 
To see validation of that fear, look no further than a recent opinion from 
the Alabama Supreme Court in a stillbirth case.396 One issue on appeal was the 
language used at trial to refer to the unborn baby.397 Justice Parker, who has 
been criticized as attempting to dismantle Roe v. Wade by emphasizing the per-
sonhood of unborn babies,398 wrote separately to explain he would have found 
error if the trial court “affirmatively prevented [the mother] from using 
Tristian’s name before the jury, or taken any action to denigrate his humani-
ty.”399 He clarified that “[a]ny efforts to stifle the recognition of an unborn 
child’s humanity[] ‘should be all the more intolerable in Alabama, where the 
express, emphatic public policy of our State is to uphold the value of unborn 
life.’ ”400 This case was about stillbirth, not abortion.401 But Justice Parker felt 
the need to also comment on abortion. 
The tension between abortion and recognition of stillbirth was also evident 
in state legislative debates over the creation of something akin to birth certifi-
cates after stillbirth. State vital recognition of stillbirth is limited to a death cer-
tificate—no birth certificate, despite the fact that mothers still very much gave 
birth. Groups of aggrieved parents fought for passage of “Missing Angels 
Acts,” creating something like a “Certificate of Birth Resulting in Stillbirth.”402 
Concerns were raised by pro-choice advocates: “Might, for example, states start 
issuing or even requiring birth certificates for aborted fetuses?”403 Former Gov-
ernor of New Mexico Bill Richardson even vetoed a popular stillbirth birth cer-
tificate bill.404 He claimed it was because of administrative concerns, but many 
                                                                                                                                
rick, Note, Fetal Personhood After the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 
553, 553–54 (2006); Amy Lotierzo, The Unborn Child, a Forgotten Interest: Reexamining 
Roe in Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279, 289 (2006); 
Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal Feminism: The “Ethic of Care,” Fetal Person-
hood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291, 291–92 (1996); Erica Richards, Note, Loss of 
Potential Parenthood as a Statutory Solution to the Conflict Between Wrongful Death Reme-
dies and Roe v. Wade, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 809, 810 (2006). 
395  Layne, supra note 231, at 294. 
396  See generally Hamilton v. Scott, No. 1150377, 2018 WL 1224234 (Ala. Mar. 9, 2018). 
397  Id. at *7. 
398  See, e.g., Nina Martin, This Alabama Judge Has Figured Out How to Dismantle Roe v. 
Wade, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/this-alabama-judge-
has figured-out-how-to-dismantle-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/DP67-YEDJ]. 
399  Hamilton, 2018 WL 1224234, at *10 (Parker, J., concurring). 
400  Id. (Parker, J., concurring) (quoting Stinnett v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202, 224 (Ala. 
2016) (Parker, J., concurring)). 
401  Id. at *1. 
402  See SANGER, supra note 155, at 4. 
403  Id. Although it is worthwhile to pause and note that states have long issued death certifi-
cates for stillbirth, which presumably should also threaten abortion. 
404  Allison Stevens, The Politics of Stillbirth, PROSPECT (July 13, 2007), http://prospect.org/a 
rticle/politics-stillbirth [https://perma.cc/MBD4-BWLV]. 
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suspected he did not want to lose pro-choice voters in his run for President.405 
In most other states, compromises were reached—mainly clarifications that the 
certificates would not apply to abortions and requiring parents to request the 
certificate—and many states now have stillbirth birth certificates.406 Regard-
less, “[t]he Missing Angel example illustrates how cautious the subject of abor-
tion has made everyone and how attentive citizens have become to even the 
possibility of a connection to abortion.”407 
This purported overlap of stillbirth and abortion is odd given that stillbirths 
and abortions happen at very different times in pregnancy. By definition, still-
births do not occur until after twenty weeks of pregnancy. The vast majority of 
abortions happen before twenty weeks of pregnancy; in 2015, almost 99 per-
cent of abortions happened before 21 weeks of pregnancy.408 Some of these 
slightly over 1 percent of abortions that occur after twenty weeks are due to 
medical conditions, either for the mother or the unborn baby.409 Simply because 
of the duration of the pregnancy, stillbirth is different than abortion. And rec-
ognizing parents’ loss in stillbirth then has little practical effect on abortion, the 
vast majority of which happen before stillbirth is even possible. 
To explain the consistency between tort recognition of stillbirth and the le-
gality of abortion, it is important to start with the fact that tort law specifically 
recognizes a woman’s right to choose, through a wrongful birth claim. Courts 
first adopted this claim after Roe v. Wade.410 Generally, wrongful birth is a 
medical malpractice claim based on the obstetrician’s failure to diagnose birth 
defects.411 “The crux of the case turns on plaintiff’s causal assertion that she 
would have chosen to terminate the pregnancy if she had been properly advised 
or treated.”412 A woman has this right and can recover compensation if tortious-
ly deprived of it. 
Many mistakenly believe that tort recognition of stillbirth would infringe 
on the right to abortion, usually fearing that tort recognition would accord some 
legal status on the unborn baby. This mistake is especially understandable if a 
wrongful death claim is based on courts’ interpreting the word “person” in the 
statute to include an unborn baby. A wrongful death claim, however, does not 
create any legal right for the baby. It is not a claim for the deceased—it is a 
claim for “certain beneficiaries who suffer from another’s death as a result of a 
                                                        
405  See id. 
406  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
407  SANGER, supra note 155, at 4. 
408  CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/CW2C-98DR]. 
409  See Maggie Fox, This Doctor Just Explained Late-Term Abortion—On Twitter, NBC 
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:28 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/doctor-just-
explained-late-term-abortion-twitter-n842611 [https://perma.cc/G29Y-6W9A]. 
410  See id. 
411  CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 109, at 128. 
412  Id. at 128–29. 
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tort.”413 It is the parents’ claim and it awards the parents damages for the lost 
affectional tie, the loss of their relationship with their baby.414 “The parent’s 
loss does not depend on the legal status of the child; indeed the absence of the 
child is the crux of the suit.”415 
The Supreme Court clarified this exact point in Roe.416 It mentioned 
wrongful death claims in discussing whether other laws recognized whether life 
“begins before live birth” or whether laws “accord[ed] legal rights to the un-
born.”417 The Court then explained that the wrongful death claim “would ap-
pear to be one to vindicate the parents’ interest and is thus consistent with the 
view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life.”418 
To further clarify the consistency, wrongful death statutes often include a 
specific exception for legal abortion. Illinois law, for example, states that no 
wrongful death cause of action exists “against a physician or a medical institu-
tion for the wrongful death of a fetus caused by an abortion where the abortion 
was permitted by law and the requisite consent was lawfully given.”419 Similar-
ly, due to the legality, the father would not have a claim against the woman af-
ter abortion. Although the father may well suffer emotional distress due to the 
                                                        
413  DOBBS, supra note 98, at 804. This is the distinction between a wrongful death claim, the 
surviving family’s claim, and a survivorship cause of action, which is the decedent’s claim. 
“Survival statutes do not provide for an independent action in favor of the deceased’s de-
pendents.” Id. “They provide for the survival of whatever action the deceased herself would 
have had if she had been able to sue at the moment of her death.” Id. 
414  See Chamallas, Architecture, supra note 9, at 500–01 (explaining that wrongful death 
claim compensates for the loss of a relationship within her discussion of tort law’s inherent 
hierarchy of injuries). 
415  Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1983). 
416  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973). 
417  Id. at 161. 
418  Id. at 162 (emphasis added). That the wrongful death claim protects the parents’ interest 
in their desired unborn child is another reason for the suggested twenty-week cutoff for the 
wrongful death claim, based on whether the parents’ expectation of having a living baby is 
reasonable. See supra note 371 and accompanying text. The concept of reasonableness of the 
parents’ interest in having their desired baby has no application in abortion law. 
419  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2.2 (2018); see also Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 
956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (dismissing various claims against an abortion clinic, 
including wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and alleged violations of 
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Act); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 
(N.J. 2007) (dismissing wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress claims). 
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abortion,420 the constitutionality of abortion shields the woman from liability in 
tort.421 
Possibly more importantly, compensation after stillbirth does not confer 
some less-defined inherent personhood or value that could threaten the legality 
of abortion. Tort law frequently awards mental anguish and loss of consortium 
damages without also conferring some special legal status on the injury. For 
instance, courts have awarded anguish-like damages for negligent destructions 
of property, like “wedding photos, baby pictures, and documents with emotion-
al value that were irreplaceable.”422 Courts have also awarded loss of consorti-
um damages after the tortious death of a pet animal.423 No one questioned 
whether those cases meant animals now have inherent personhood or value 
comparable to personhood. The loss of wedding pictures and animals are not at 
all comparable to stillbirth, in my opinion. The point though is that tort law 
awards these damages frequently without creating some sort of new legal rule 
regarding the value of pictures and animals. Instead, those court decisions mean 
that others who tortiously lose special pictures or animals can seek compensa-
tion. Similarly, awarding mental anguish and loss of consortium damages after 
stillbirth does not create some new precedent that would chip away at abortion 
rights. 
Another clear distinction between a wrongful death claim and abortion is 
existence of opposing interests. In the wrongful death context, the mother’s in-
terest in the unborn child and the state’s interest in the same unborn child 
align—both want the pregnancy to be successful and for the child to be born 
alive. Those interests do not align in the case of abortion. The state is still inter-
ested in protecting the life of the unborn child, but the woman lacks the same 
interest. And pregnancy and possible birth of that child will affect the woman 
in a way it will affect no one else. That is why, as the Court held in Roe, the 
woman has a right to choose to not become a mother. The difference in the 
                                                        
420  See infra Section C. (discussing the father’s loss after stillbirth). See Seymore, supra note 
210, at 841. Professor Malinda Seymore summarized the results of studies of men’s reac-
tions to abortion. The “unsurprising” result was that “different men experience abortion dif-
ferently.” Id. In one study, men expressed grief, sadness, anger, and experienced various 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. In another study of men in months or a year 
after the abortion, “most participants said that they were satisfied with the abortion decision, 
expressing feelings of relief.” Id. 
421  See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1201–02 (2014) (finding that the constitutionality of abor-
tion precludes it from being extreme and outrageous conduct); see also id. (explaining that 
allowing the father a tort claim would “function exactly like a requirement of spousal con-
sent, held unconstitutional long ago.”). 
422  See Dubey v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 283 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009). 
423  See, e.g., Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) 
(affirming that the loss of companionship could be used as an element in determining dam-
ages in a property damage case, similar to the treatment of other items of sentimental value, 
such as heirlooms and photographs, but refusing to extend an independent cause of action for 
loss of companionship). 
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aligning versus competing interests is a simple reason why the recognition and 
regulation of stillbirth and abortion can and should differ, yet still be consistent. 
The same differing interests exist in the criminalization of the death of an 
unborn child and abortion. “As of 2005, at least thirty-three states criminalized 
the killing of a fetus under regular homicide statutes, separate feticide laws, or 
judicial interpretations of the criminal code.”424 Some of these state statutes 
have existed for a long time; California passed its first statute in 1970, years 
before Roe.425 Like they have with wrongful death claims, the pro-choice side 
opposed these criminal measures. As Professor Carolyn B. Ramsey explained, 
that opposition is an overreaction: “While critics of fetal homicide laws often 
depict them as a monolithic threat to reproductive freedom, this broad-brush 
approach is more polemical than informative.”426 Instead, the two measures can 
easily coexist, and have for many years, given the differing interests; “[w]hen 
the law criminalizes the lethal conduct of a third-party attacker, there are no 
competing interests to weigh.”427 
Last, denying recovery, pretending as if parents do not really lose anything 
in stillbirth, denies reality. Some women, and men, very quickly develop a rela-
tionship with their unborn child. That has always been true. It was true when 
the Court decided Roe. And it is even sometimes true in abortion.428 Downplay-
ing this reality is neither persuasive nor credible. Devaluing one woman’s loss 
after stillbirth does not protect another woman’s abortion rights. 
The reality is that abortion is complicated. To glibly state “[a]pparently, 
because of the unique relationship between a mother and her fetus, a woman is 
allowed to perform a harmful action that would not be allowed by others” is 
oversimplifying.429 Some parents view stillbirth as the loss of their child and 
other parents choose, for whatever reason, to terminate a pregnancy. As Profes-
sor Sanger explained: “This is not inconsistency but rather an awareness of 
context.”430 
                                                        
424  Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide Laws, 67 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 721, 734 (2006). 
425  Id. at 733. 
426  Id. at 743. 
427  Id. at 740. 
428  SANGER, supra note 155, at 132–33 (discussing the difference between feelings of loss 
and regret after abortion). 
429  Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in 
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 971 (1995). 
430  SANGER, supra note 155, at 104; see also id. at 103 (explaining that “pro-choice women 
may scoff at ‘I’m a Child, Not a Choice’ placards and at the same time feel excitement look-
ing at the scan of an expected grandchild”); id. at 81 (“Even those who do not regard an ul-
trasound image as proof of personhood understand that it functions as such for others.”). But 
see id. at 4 (discussing inherent concern that “it may no longer be possible to cabin the cul-
ture or political meaning of anything to do with fetal life or death in the United States”). 
Sometimes context cannot readily explain away an inconsistency. For example, in a Colora-
do case, a Catholic hospital found the abortion and wrongful death contexts separate enough 
to be able to argue that unborn child is not a person in the liability for wrongful death con-
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Context often controls views on abortion. This is certainly true on a per-
sonal level. A pro-choice woman can still doubt that she could ever have an 
abortion. Similarly, a pro-life woman may want an abortion after rape or incest. 
The American public also takes a “contextual view of homicide and to recog-
nize that abortion does not equate to fetal murder.”431 Context also controls le-
gally; a law can exist based on the sentiment that all life is precious, yet still 
allow abortion in cases of rape or incest.432 
“[W]omen’s attitudes regarding prenatal life are not fixed or universal.”433 
This is true for abortion and for involuntary pregnancy loss. Women have dif-
ferent opinions about their losses in miscarriages, pregnancy loss before twenty 
weeks, the same timeframe in which the vast majority of abortions taken place. 
If early, some may not believe that they lost a child. Or even if they believe 
they lost a child, they had not named that child nor considered him a part of the 
family.434 But for stillbirth, pregnancy loss after twenty weeks, including the 
unborn baby dying during labor, the vast majority of parents believe that they 
lost a child. Tort’s law recognition of another contextual view of unborn babies 
specific to stillbirth does not affect another woman’s right to choose abortion. 
A woman’s rights to reproductive health should not be limited to her right 
to abortion. This recognition reflects the shift from the reproductive rights 
movement to the more recent reproductive justice movement.435 Instead of fo-
cusing almost exclusively on abortion, the reproductive justice movement is 
“equally about the right to not have children, the right to have children, the 
right to parent with dignity, and the means to achieve these rights.”436 In still-
birth, the woman chose to keep that pregnancy and bonded with her child. After 
twenty weeks of pregnancy, she reasonably expected to give birth to a living 
child. A woman who loses that choice and her child in a tortiously caused still-
birth should be able to sue that tortfeasor for her child’s wrongful death. Con-
                                                                                                                                
text. Ben Brumfield & Kyung Lah, Lawyers for Catholic Hospital Argue That a Fetus is Not 
a Person, CNN (Jan. 27, 2013, 1:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/26/us/colorado-fetu 
s-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/NSF3-L852]; see generally Stodghill v. Pelner, No. 
07CV522, 2010 WL 9103730 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 2010). 
431  Ramsey, supra note 424, at 731–32; see also id. at 730 (“The widely held view that 
third-party killers of fetuses should suffer serious criminal penalties contrasts with the pub-
lic’s enduring support for legal but limited access to abortion.”). 
432  See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
421, 444 (1996) (“This position risks moral inconsistency: If they oppose abortion because 
they believe that the fetus is an entity with interests, then protecting only fetuses with certain 
genes, or only those not conceived by rape or incest, is morally inconsistent.”). 
433  SANGER, supra note 155, at 146. 
434  See LAYNE, supra note 3, at 8. 
435  See Rachel Rebouché, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and 
Human Rights, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 579, 594 (2017) (explaining that the reproductive 
rights movement focuses almost exclusively on abortion rights, and that the reproductive 
justice movement believes the abortion focus “diverts attention away from a range of other 
reproductive experiences.”). 
436  Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327, 343 
(2013). 
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sistent with reproductive justice theory, proper recognition of stillbirth and 
abortion rights can and should coexist. 
CONCLUSION 
Normally, the best way to accentuate an injury is to recognize a specific 
claim. That accentuation is apparent in tort law’s specific recognition of wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life claims, which really are medical malpractice claims 
with distinct injuries. Professor Dov Fox recently also suggested a specific “re-
productive negligence” claim to identify and highlight the unique harms of im-
posed procreation, deprived procreation, and confounded procreation.437 He 
specifically explained the need for a distinct claim to accentuate these harms.438 
For stillbirth, though, the problem is not the lack of distinction. Instead, the 
problem is the distinction. Consider statistical recognition of stillbirth. Deaths 
due to stillbirth are “not counted in infant mortality data,”439 meaning the death 
of an infant before his or her first birthday.440 Little, if any, developmental dif-
ference exists between a full-term stillborn baby and a baby born alive. But ba-
bies born alive—premature and full-term—who later die are counted in infant 
mortality data.441 Stillborn babies are not. “A country’s rate of infant mortality 
is commonly used as a marker to measure societal well-being. Yet, stillbirths, 
even at full-term, are not counted in infant mortality data, thus, affecting public 
perception, funding, and research.”442 
Tort law’s distinct treatment similarly devalues stillbirth. The best way for 
tort law to recognize and value stillbirth then, is to remove the distinction. 
Stillbirth is the death of a child. Just like any childbirth, the mother delivered 
the baby. And the parents got to hold that baby before having to say goodbye. 
Stillbirth is no different than the death of a child, and tort law should recognize 
it as such. 
                                                        
437  See generally Fox, supra note 223. He does not mention tortiously caused pregnancy 
loss, whether it be miscarriage or stillbirth. It seems to fit best in his category of deprived 
procreation. But stillbirth is also very different than the examples he provides in this catego-
ry: fertility clinics negligently losing eggs, sperm, or embryos, and wrongful abortion—a 
doctor misadvising couples of potential birth defects, causing the woman to abort an actually 
healthy fetus. See id. at 194. None of those examples involve burying a child. He did not ad-
vocate, nor would I advocate, a wrongful death claim for the loss of eggs, sperm, or embry-
os. 
438  See id. at 212. 
439  Cacciatore, Feminist, supra note 71, at 92. 
440  Infant Mortality, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/repr 
oductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/infantmortality.htm [https://perma.cc/NU5B-GYXR] 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
441  See Karen Kaplan, Premature Births a Big Factor in U.S. Infant Mortality Rate, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-infa 
nt-mortality-us-ranks-26th-20140924-story.html [https://perma.cc/2KBU-7H7X]. 
442  Cacciatore, Feminist, supra note 71, at 92. 
